The Accidental Statesman: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq

In late April 2003, Major General David Petraeus and the US Army's 101st Airborne Division entered the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, capital of Nineveh Province. It was less than a month since the start of the US invasion of Iraq. But US troops had already captured Baghdad, dictator Saddam Hussein had fled and, while security was still an overriding concern, the US military was no longer in full battle mode. In Mosul, Petraeus quickly found himself confronting the question: What next?

The city of 1.7 million was a shambles as much from looting as from war. US Marines had just killed 17 Iraqis during a riot. The streets were in chaos, with police and other security forces nowhere to be seen. The city had no electricity, running water or garbage removal. Shops were closed. Most public buildings and factories lay in ruins. There was no administrative or economic infrastructure; ministries in Baghdad which under Saddam had controlled all economic activity were now inoperative. Those who had led the old Iraq had vanished: political leaders, judges, university faculty, teachers, factory managers, ministry directors. The most senior of them were anyway suspect as members of the reviled former ruling Baath, Party.

Addressing these deficiencies was hardly standard military business. But there was no one else to do it. As Petraeus saw it, his task was to provide the building blocks for a new Iraqi society. How, the general wondered, could he and his "Screaming Eagles" --as the division had been known since World War II--reestablish conditions for normal daily life and help create the norms of a democratic society? Whom could he trust? What was most urgent? What message should he give his troops? What was the trade-offs between security and building bridges to the local population?

Petraeus found himself arbitrating a dizzying array of questions: How could he involve Iraqis in the rebuilding? Should there be elections? If so, who should stand? Could some Baath Party officials retain their jobs? If so, which ones? How and who should pay the thousands of unemployed civil servants?

What about controlling inflation? Should border crossings reopen for trade? How could he re-start the university, open banks, and foster the creation of new businesses? What about the media? Underlying these operational dilemmas lay a deeper uncertainty: could Petraeus establish himself as a leader whose decisions were not only appropriate--but whose style would command the respect of a society not his own?

Run-up to Mosul

When the 101st Airborne first crossed into Iraq from Kuwait on Friday, March 21, 2003, Petraeus had not known that the division would be sent to Mosul. In fact, the entire short war, like its lead-up, had been one of continual adaptation to changing circumstances. Petraeus had gotten word only on February 6 that the division, based at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, would deploy to Kuwait for possible hostilities against

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Iraq. Though long anticipated, that gave him barely six weeks to move more than 18,000 soldiers, over 5,000 vehicles, hundreds of containers, and 256 helicopters (including 72 Apaches valued at $20 million each) to Kuwait. The campaign known as Operation Iraqi Freedom, which US policymakers characterized as liberating Iraq, started on March 20. The US led a coalition of forces which, while heavily American, also included troops from Britain, Spain, Poland, Italy and elsewhere.

The 101st was a division of light infantry designated “air assault” because of its numerous helicopters (the most of any division in the world). Its core was three infantry brigades of over 4,000 soldiers each, led respectively in spring 2003 by Colonel Benjamin Hodges (161), Colonel Joseph Anderson (2nd) and Colonel Michael Linnington (3rd). It also had a Division Artillery (three battalions), two aviation brigades (nine battalions), a Division Support Command (five battalions), as well as engineer, signal, air defense, and military intelligence battalions. It was called “airborne” for its history, which included parachuting into Normandy on D-Day in June 1944. Division units had since served in Vietnam, the Gulf War, the Balkans and Afghanistan. Going into Iraq, it had the unique capability of transporting troops far into the enemy’s rear, as much as 150 kilometers in a single lift.

In Iraq, the division knew it was in for a fight. The 101st first fought its way north to the city of An Najaf, site of the holiest shrine in Shiite Islam with a population of over 500,000. The 1st and 2nd Brigades subdued An Najaf by April 1, the first major city cleared by the US-led coalition. On April 6, the 2nd Brigade took Karbala, a major Shi'ite city 60 miles southwest of Baghdad. Several days later, the 3rd Brigade captured the town of Al Hilla.

Then on Wednesday, April 9, the 101st was ordered to head for southern Baghdad below the Tigris River, where it expected to remain for a while. General Petraeus and his officers selected a former weapons factory, the Al Qadisiyah State Establishment, as divisional headquarters, and moved in on Sunday. "We thought the farthest we were going to go was a little bit north of Baghdad," recalls Petraeus. Saddam Hussein’s government had collapsed on April 9 and on Monday, April 14, the Pentagon declared an end to major hostilities in Iraq. While the 101st had faced occasionally stiff resistance, it lost only two soldiers in combat, with some 50 wounded.

But the 101st assignment was just beginning. Far from staying in Baghdad, the division learned on Friday, April 18, that it would be dispatched to northern Iraq to take control of Nineveh province and its capital, Mosul. The 101st was a replacement for the force originally assigned to the area: the 4th Infantry Division had been scheduled to enter Iraq from Turkey and occupy the northern sector. But on March 1, Turkey’s parliament had voted to prohibit US troops from using Turkish bases, and the 4th Infantry was headed instead--after considerable delay and a detour via the Persian Gulf--through Kuwait to Baghdad. The 101st, says Colonel Anderson, was sent to Mosul because "we were available" and, with its helicopter fleet, could get there fast. The result was that the 101st arrived in Mosul with minimal information about the city, its people, or the surrounding province.

Arrival

The sector for which Petraeus would be responsible stretched from the Syrian border in the west to Kurdish territory in the north and east--an area measuring 75,000 square kilometers. His first decisions were tactical--where should he place which troops? Clearly, Mosul was the center of gravity and would have to be secured first. Because the 2nd Brigade would occupy the city center, Petraeus sent Colonel Anderson to reconnoiter Mosul and report back in detail. How to deploy on the ground would be their call. Notes Petraeus:
“It literally was my decision. Nobody above us knew more than we did. It wasn't as if the staff had any great expertise on Nineveh and northern Iraq. There was nobody we could turn to that could tell us anything about northern Iraq, other than locals once we got there.”

Anderson arrived at noon on Sunday, April 20 at the Mosul airfield. There he found a small force of Marines from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, as well as some Special Forces. Anderson heard conflicting reports about the state of affairs in Mosul. The Marines told him it was dangerous; the Special Forces painted a calmer picture.

The Marines had reason to fear the city. Mosul had fallen to a handful of Special Forces and Kurdish peshmerga without a fight as the defending Iraq Army's Fifth Corps simply melted away. But—as the Marines told Anderson upon arrival—on Tuesday, April 15, the Marines had been forced to subdue a riot that broke out in front of the governor's office after Mishaan al Jabouri, a local leader suspected of ties to Saddam Hussein, had declared himself mayor. During two days of violence, the Marines shot and killed 17 Iraqis. As a result, troops at the airfield were in a state of high alert. As Anderson characterizes their posture: "As soon as the sun goes down, anything that moves--be it a dog, a garbage can or a person--gets shot at."

Nonetheless, Anderson decided to take a "commander's reconnaissance" drive around Mosul in order to test the waters and come up with a recommendation for Petraeus. Up to this point, with the military in battle mode, orders had been to "shoot first, ask questions later," recalls Anderson. But with the declared end to hostilities, operations had entered a different phase, although its rules of engagement were still unclear. The questions Anderson was asking himself were: "How do we occupy Mosul? Do we land on the outside and fight our way in, or do we just go in and occupy?" There was only one way to find out, says Anderson: do as he had done in Kosovo.

“Go right into the heart of it. If I get shot at, if I get rocks thrown at me, if everybody surrounds the vehicles, I know we've got a problem. So we drove right in there just to figure out what was going to be the reaction.”

His three-vehicle convoy consulted a rudimentary map of the city. After a six-hour drive in a Humvee and no unpleasant incidents, Anderson had what he wanted. He decided to occupy the city, not attack it—and radioed that recommendation to Petraeus, who approved it. As for deployment, Anderson had found a location for his brigade headquarters—an old hospital compound near City Hall in the center of town. Based on the day's observations, he also had a plan for where to locate company and battalion command posts.

On April 21, the Division launched the longest air assault in its history, transporting over 1,500 soldiers of the 2nd Brigade to Mosul in one lift. Ground vehicles came separately with the balance of the force. In less than 24 hours, Colonel Anderson moved his brigade into the city. Once all had arrived, Anderson had 6,000 troops at his command: 4 infantry battalions, a military police battalion, an artillery battalion, an engineer company, a tank company, a military intelligence company, a signal company, a support battalion and an air cavalry squadron. Importantly, Anderson decided to establish for his soldiers a restrictive rule of engagement: shoot only when fired upon. The tactic was risky; he might lose some men. But, he explains, "I knew that any Iraqi that we killed was going to be one more challenge that I didn't need ... This is risk taking: doing things without being told, say I'm going to do it and ask permission later." In subsequent weeks, the 1st Brigade flew from Najaf and Hilla to Qayyarah, where it established its headquarters and took responsibility for the area south of Mosul; while the 3rd Brigade redeployed from Baghdad to the Tal Afar airfield and took control of the western sector of Nineveh, including the border with Syria.
Petraeus arrived at Mosul airfield on Tuesday, April 22. He decided to locate the main division headquarters in a former palace of Saddam Hussein's across the Tigris River and a few kilometers north of Anderson's headquarters. Although he would have preferred a less symbolic location, the general needed a space that could accommodate thousands of people--staff, a signal battalion, military intelligence, civil affairs, and engineers. The complex of palace buildings was also empty and defensible--a key consideration in a war zone. As the troops deployed to their new bases, Petraeus began his own version of a commander's recon--but of the political and economic, as well as the military, landscape. To this task, he brought singular qualifications.

David H. Petraeus

The man handed the task of running Mosul and Nineveh in April 2003 was a career military officer. He was born in 1952, son of Sixtus Petraeus, a Dutch sea captain who fled Holland for the US during World War II. At 17, David Petraeus enrolled at the US Military Academy at West Point, from which he graduated near the top of his class in 1974. His concentration was premed--a subject selected, he later confessed, because "it was the toughest." At 5 feet 9 inches, the newly minted second lieutenant was one of two class members who were "star" men (for academic achievement), had earned a varsity letter and had attained the rank of Cadet Captain. He married Holly Knowlton, daughter of the West Point superintendent, whom he'd met on a blind date.

After a stint at the elite US Army Ranger School, his assignments took him quickly to high echelons. In addition to normal infantry assignments, he served as a special assistant to NATO Supreme Commander John R. Galvin, aide to Army Chief of Staff Carl Vuono, and executive officer for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry H. Shelton. Petraeus' tours with Vuono and Shelton entailed countless trips overseas, allowing him to observe firsthand senior officers dealing at high levels with their foreign counterparts. He also learned how to work in the interagency environment of Washington. His West Point yearbook entry captured his approach to life: whether in athletics, academics, or other endeavors, he was always "going for it...a striver to the max."\textsuperscript{10}

In 1987, Petraeus earned a PhD in international relations and economics from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School. His thesis title was "The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam." By 1991, he was commander of a battalion in the 101\textsuperscript{st} Airborne. On September 21, he was watching an infantry squad conduct a live-fire exercise when a rifleman tripped and fell. The soldier inadvertently shot off an M-16 round, which went right through Petraeus' chest. The young officer was rushed to Vanderbilt University Medical Center in Nashville, where Petraeus' commanding officer summoned from a golf game the top surgeon available. Dr. William Frist, who in 1994 was elected senator from Tennessee and in 2002 became Senate Majority Leader, operated on Petraeus. The two became enduring friends. But Petraeus was not done tempting fate. In 2000, while serving as a brigadier general at Fort Bragg, he survived the collapse of his parachute 60 feet above the ground. It was his 88th free-fall jump. With his pelvis screwed together, Petraeus returned to active duty. "It made me faster," he recounts with a smile.

Several of his assignments took him abroad. Petraeus' first assignment was to Italy with an elite airborne unit that participated in NATO exercises throughout Europe. He spent a summer in Panama in the mid-1980s on temporary duty for General Galvin, then-commander of the US Southern Command which was helping El Salvador combat an insurgency. In the late 1980s, he worked for Galvin again at NATO's Supreme Headquarters in Europe, and then did a tour with an infantry battalion in Germany. Petraeus spent the spring of 1995 as operations officer for the United Nations Mission as it established itself in Haiti. He oversaw the risky decision to send multinational troops out from the comparative safety of the capital, Port-au-Prince, into the countryside to bring order to the country as a whole.
While the assistant division commander for operations of the 82nd Airborne Division in 1989, Petraeus served a month-long stint as commander of then-Lieutenant General Tommy Franks' forward unit in Kuwait. After his parachuting accident, Petraeus in 2001-2002 worked in Bosnia as assistant chief of staff for operations for the NATO-led SFOR (Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina). In Bosnia, he also served as deputy commander of a joint task force for war criminal operations, and then after September 11 as deputy commander of a counter-terrorism joint interagency task force. There Petraeus had the opportunity to work with all the US intelligence agencies plus all the elements of the Special Forces, teaching him how indispensable first-rate intelligence was to effective military operations. He also learned the mechanics of multinational operations in a complex ethno-religious context.

In July 2002, Petraeus returned to the US to assume command of the 101st Airborne. By the time the division reached Mosul, it had been well tested in battle. The next weeks and months would test it in peace.

Who’s Job to Rebuild?

Petraeus had concluded as early as his time in Al Hilla that the task of rebuilding Iraq would be enormous. "I understand the intellectual aversion to nation-building," he told a reporter, referring to the philosophy of some in the Bush Administration. "On the other hand, I don’t see how you avoid it." In his few days in An Najaf, he had gone so far as to reopen the airport, bring in the Red Crescent (Red Cross) Society, and seek an audience with an influential cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. "He thought he could set up An Najaf as a showcase," says Colonel William Abb, the 101st chief of plans and exercises from June 2002 to June 2003. Even in southern Baghdad--to jumpstart the evolution from combat to post-hostilities--he had commissioned an assessment of hospitals, clinics, the infrastructure, power generators and water purification. "I'd already made my first visit to an electrical generating plant, had already started figuring out: Can we get little bits of money to clean up the streets? Who are these guys that are mukhtars, what's their role? Who are the main sheikhs in the city?" remembers Petraeus.

But Petraeus had anticipated only short-term involvement in answering these questions: be it in Baghdad or elsewhere. Like the rest of the top military officers in Iraq, Petraeus had come to Iraq focused on fighting a war, not on rebuilding a society. Most post-conflict restructuring would, they had all believed, fall to the civilian Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)--an interagency organization established to manage postwar reconstruction, governance and assistance in Iraq. Retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner arrived in Iraq on April 21 as head of ORHA and the chief US administrator in Iraq. "We had been told that ORHA, working together with Iraqi exiles and Iraqis who would be on the job, would take the lead," remembers Petraeus. "We would be in a supporting role."

Army and Peacekeeping. However, during what was envisioned as a brief interim period until ORHA could get up and running the Army's V Corps would handle some administrative functions (post-conflict activities). Its initial so-called Civil-Military Operations (CMO) strategy, designed in the final days of the military conflict, was intended to "set the conditions for the battle hand-off" to ORHA and, eventually, a new Iraqi government. The strategy had three goals: provide a secure environment, restore basic life services, and facilitate a return to normalcy. Under these overarching categories came some 15 specific objectives, such as reestablishing electricity and water supplies; food distribution; restoring public safety forces (police, fire, and prisons); reopening schools; the restoration of civil government; and securing public records, cultural sites and financial institutions. But while the goals and objectives were spelled out, the strategies were not. Commanders on the ground would have to figure it out. In the case of Nineveh, as Assistant Division Commander for Operations (ADC-O) Brigadier General Benjamin
Freakley recalls, "there was no guidance going up there. The guidance was get to Mosul, secure the situation, and get it as stable as you can."

Peace-building, or nation-building, was not new to the Army. Neither the military brass nor the Bush Administration, however, had much enthusiasm for it. As then-National Security Advisor Condooleezza Rice said in 2001, "there is nothing wrong with nation building, but not when it's done by the American military." Nonetheless, the US military had accumulated experience with just that in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999) and Afghanistan (2001). Military forces had also, on an ad hoc basis, contributed to humanitarian assistance and economic development.

Meanwhile, ORHA had at least a rudimentary presence in northern Iraq, where Petraeus was headed. A Region North CONOP (Concept of Operations) plan stipulated that ORHA's priority task was to "facilitate and integrate all available resources" for humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and civil administration, and to direct the transition to an Iraqi-led government. In a presentation on April 20, ORHA Region North Coordinator Major General (retired) Bruce Moore listed his intentions: to meet with community leaders at all levels, to determine overall priorities, and to aim for quick impact. He cited as major problems oil distribution, water, power, medical care, salaries, and ethnic and political tensions.

But to address these and other problems, Moore had only about 10 staff--not a large force. Moreover, ORHA North was headquartered in the guesthouse of Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani in Irbil, a peaceful area northeast of Mosul and well inside the Kurdish zone. Moore proposed to open offices in Mosul and Kirkuk only 15-90 days later. This was too late for Petraeus, who was already in Mosul and facing urgent challenges. Petraeus quickly surmised that, for the time being, the 101st would have to pick up the slack.

For the time being, ORHA was simply too small and too disorganized to deal with immediate crises. In fact, ORHA itself did not last long. In mid-May, it metamorphosed into another agency: the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). CPA published a comprehensive strategic plan for post-hostilities Iraq, dubbed "A Vision to Empower Iraqis," only in late July 2003. So for now, in April 2003, the 101st coordinated with ORHA, and even sent them a staff lawyer, Major Susan Arnold, who became their chief of operations. But the division set its own course.

Technically, the military's post-conflict plan--known as Phase Four Bravo--was scheduled to go into effect on May 2. However, the swift battlefield victory had accelerated that schedule. As one observer noted:

"Why were the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division--who were trained to clean latrines but not to build them--given the daunting task of making the cities and villages of northern Iraq work again? Because when they were ordered 300 miles north of Baghdad after the city fell, there was no one else around to do it."

For his own part, Petraeus felt fortunate as he considered the next steps in Mosul to be able to draw on his experiences in Central America, Haiti and Bosnia. As his chief of staff in Mosul, Thomas Schoenbeck, remembers it, Petraeus "understood the reconstruction part of the war better than any of us who had studied it or had some experience." The general was apt to appraise issues at a strategic rather than a tactical level. Recalls Schoenbeck: "He would say no, you have to think longer-range than that. You have to think US national interest, and how are we going to achieve that up here in Mosul? And how is it then going to affect things from Baghdad or in Baghdad?"

His commanders, too, had peacekeeping experience. Colonel Anderson had served in Kosovo, where he commanded the first US battalion into the area; and had fought as a company commander in Panama.
Anderson had also taught at the Naval War College for two years. Colonel Linnington was just back from several months in Afghanistan, and Colonel Hodges had served in Bosnia; and been a senior observer at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Unlike the traditional, big-battle approach taken at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin (California), the JRTC emphasized low-intensity conflict and nation building. Role playing exercises obliged commanders and soldiers to interact with local officials and citizens. "The scenarios proved to be very instructive," says Petraeus (who led a brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division through a rotation there in 1987).

Meet and Greet

As Petraeus considered how to approach his assignment in Mosul, he first asked for a quick history lesson. The city, he learned, was ancient, a once-walled bastion dating back some 3,500 years and renowned in the Bible as Nineveh. Its population numbered 1.7 million; the province had over 3.5 million people. A center of nationalism, Mosul had a proud history of military leadership; thousands of generals were native sons. Mosul had been headquarters for the Iraqi Fifth Corps. It was also a distinguished university town, an oil center and a commercial crossroads. Finally, the cosmopolitan city was the most ethnically diverse in Iraq—which also made it a potential flashpoint for ethnic tensions. A Sunni Arab majority obtained, but the city—as well as its surrounding region—was home to numerous other groups: Shiite Arabs, Kurds (from two political camps), Shabak, Turkmen, Assyrian Christians and Yezidi.

Petraeus already knew from pre-war briefings how the economy and politics used to work in Iraq. Under Saddam, all orders emanated from central ministries in Baghdad. Each industry or functional area had a ministry, and each ministry had directors general in each province. Resources flowed from the ministry headquarters in Baghdad to the directors general in the provinces, bypassing provincial governors. On the political front, Saddam and the Baath Party controlled everything. Governors and provincial councils had mostly symbolic influence on activities within their jurisdictions. But that was about the extent of what he knew. As ADC-O Freakley puts it: "The commanding general found himself in a very violent, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment."18

The next step was to find out who in Mosul had controlled what. In Kosovo, remembers Anderson, State Department diplomatic observers knew who the power brokers were. But in Mosul there were no State Department observers—and even had there been any, the previous power brokers had long since departed when the regime fell. Accordingly, Petraeus called a meeting on Wednesday, April 23, his first full day in town, of 40 retired Iraqi generals. The Iraqi army had been notoriously top-heavy: an army of some 500,000 was overseen by 11,000 generals and 14,000 colonels.19 A good number of these former army officers lived in Mosul, and the 40 generals claimed to represent some 1,000 former officers in the province.

From the generals, Petraeus secured a general commitment to help restore order. He then began to identify and contact local tribal chiefs, emerging political leaders, university professors, judicial figures, religious leaders, and local businessmen, hoping to learn who represented which factions within the city and province. Early reports were not only that looting and petty crime had destroyed large sections of the city, but that--absent Saddam's strong hand--ethnic rivalries were reasserting themselves, with almost daily skirmishes and shootings. Petraeus was prepared to do a lot of mediation work himself. As he saw it, leadership can mean simultaneously setting a vision and, as necessary, micromanagement. He amplifies:

Some people will say Petraeus is way down into details, and I have that capacity. Others will say 'Man, he just let me do my thing.' The truth is it takes all of the above. Leadership styles should vary depending on who is being led, how much detailed guidance and supervision they need, and their capacity for sound, independent action.
As early as Saturday, April 26, four days after his arrival, Petraeus sat in on a meeting between two key political rivals. Brigadier General Eyad Hamdany was the regional representative of the Iraqi National Congress—a party of exiles led by Ahmed Chalabi. Hamdany had defected in 1982, and was a leader of a large, influential Mosul family. Mishaa al Jabouri was the politician whose claims on the steps of City Hall had sparked the mid-April riot in which Marines shot Iraqis. Jabouri was a divisive figure, suspected by many Iraqis of doing business with Saddam's son Uday, then fleeing with hundreds of thousands of dollars. But he was also an acknowledged leader, head of the so-called Fatherland Party, and member of a powerful clan. Hamdany and Al Jabouri typically argued—forcefully and loudly. Petraeus told them, as well as others who were quickly brought into the process that it was “okay to shout, but not to shoot.” The Iraqis were to discuss how best to establish an interim local authority.

As Petraeus saw it, the Army had two choices in Mosul. "We could either fill the vacuum completely ourselves," he later said, "In which case over time it would be increasingly more difficult to extricate ourselves from running everything. Or we could start the process of getting Iraqis involved in self-government and filling that vacuum." He decided on the second course. "When you have to carry a particularly heavy rucksack," he observes (using an infantry metaphor) it sure helps to have others help shoulder the load." At that point, he had only a general notion of where he wanted to go—but a determination to involve Iraqis in running their country. As he puts it: "You've got to have some general guidelines and a general approach—and then you've got to get after it."

Staging a (S)election

To Petraeus, the best way to engage Iraqis in rebuilding their own country was to give them at least the semblance of a representative government. To him, that meant some form of elections. Petraeus and his staff discussed the fact that in Afghanistan, by contrast with Iraq, an interim government was in place within weeks of toppling the Taliban. It had worked there. Admittedly, there were other options—such as imposing a military regime on the city, or appointing a government composed of the least-tainted former leaders. But these would not involve Iraqis in building their own future.

At the same time, there were plenty of obstacles to staging an election. For one, there was no template—the 101st would have to make it up as it went along. Petraeus and his staff did debate whether it was best to wait for the UN or ORHA to run elections. But ORHA had as yet no national plan for elections, and it could be as long as two years before such could be organized. Petraeus knew, says chief of staff Schoenbeck, "that he was getting out in front of any elections that would ever take place in Baghdad."

But General Petraeus was a guy who was willing to take some risks. He knew that to stabilize the northern region, and to prevent riots and to pin the responsibility back on the Iraqi people and to get them to feel they were part of the solution instead of just the US making all the decisions, that we had to get elections going.

Petraeus decided that, at least in Mosul, the time to put Iraqis in charge was now, while the US occupation had momentum and the military at least a measure of credibility. "We had established ourselves as so powerful that nobody was going to challenge us at that point in time," he says. "There was a wait-and-see attitude." The general and his staff also debated whether the election should be for governor of the province, mayor of Mosul, or both. The consensus was that the election would be for governor and a provincial council, who would on a provisional basis, also serves as mayor and city council of Mosul.
As Petraeus was well aware, elections were not a familiar concept to most Iraqis—the last national elections with competing candidates had been held in 1953. Nonetheless, he wanted any interim government to be as representative as possible. By Sunday, April 27, a committee of seven leading Mosul citizens had agreed to help stage indirect elections—which the Americans called a (s)election. "The election," says Petraeus, "was all about trying to ensure representation as fairly as we could of all the different tribes, districts [the political entity below provinces], interest groups, political parties and ethnic groups. What we were doing was just listening to everybody—all day long—and expanding the size of the tent constantly."

Much Army staff time went into trying to determine political jurisdictional boundaries, who should get representation, and how much. They were also relearning the rules of elections. "We were taking out 7th grade civics books trying to figure out how do you do this? We had to have the engineers build ballot boxes," remembers Chief of Staff Schoenbeck.

**Trial and Error.** There was no guarantee in those early days, concedes Anderson that the US Army officers were picking the right power brokers. "You have to put them at the same table," says Anderson, "and eventually their intentions will become known ... You have to find out what their motives are." So starting with Hamdany and Al Jabouri, Petraeus steadily expanded the group of Iraqi leaders until it included sheikhs, imams, businessmen, former military leaders, professors, doctors, bishops, Kurds (of both parties), Shabaks, Turkmen and so forth. At the same time, comments Colonel Abb, "you have to be careful that you are not giving somebody legitimacy by simply meeting with them."

If you've accidentally given credibility to someone [undeserving], then the onus remains on you to deal with it. The division would have to almost publicly denounce someone in order to remove any credibility that he got from having a meeting with Petraeus.

Meanwhile, the 101st was getting an immersion lesson in certain aspects of Iraqi culture. "The Iraqi culture," says Abb, "was you always had to get permission for everything under Saddam's regime, and now we were the new man in town. The second was the culture of denunciation... If we'd believed everything we heard in the first week, then all of them should have been shot." Adds Anderson: "In practical terms, you are starving for knowledge... but you had to be careful what you promised." Without a census, without demographic data, "all you could do was keep assessing, analyzing," he remembers. It never got any easier because you're dealing with people who had emotions, feelings of hatred. No matter what you tried to do, there was disagreement over who was persecuted the most by Saddam.

Petraeus was working hard to discern which local leaders could be helpful, and which should be discouraged. On Wednesday, April 30, for example, Petraeus persuaded Issam Mahmood, an influential former lieutenant general whom Saddam had jailed and tortured for plotting a coup in 2000, to support the (s)election as a delegate. At the same time, the US general had concluded that neither Hamdany nor Al Jabouri, polarizing figures in the community, was likely to play a constructive role. So he worked to convince them that, because each had played an important part in spearheading the process, neither should stand for election. It was a hard sell, but it succeeded.

In a six-hour meeting Petraeus held on Thursday, May 1, with Iraqi generals, tribal leaders and politicians, an election plan began to come together. Those assembled agreed that Monday, May 5, would be Election Day. The "slate" would include representatives from each major ethnic group. The governor/mayor would be a Sunni Arab from a local "great family." He (no mention was made of women), his father and grandfather had to be born in Mosul. The candidate would have experience running a large organization, and be vigorous enough to handle the anticipated challenges. He would not
be aligned with any political party. The winner could serve only one term. The deputy governor/mayor would be a Kurd. The two assistant governors would be Assyrian Christian and Turkmen.

A convention of over 250 delegates—chosen by caucus from within each designated ethnic group—would choose a 24-member Provincial Council, which would then elect the governor from among Petraeus-approved candidates. The process, Petraeus acknowledged, was not what Americans would call democratic. But it could work. He terms it "democratically selected... To be truthful, it was a quota system, ethnic engineering to ensure that all major groups, districts and elements were properly represented. The Iraqis agreed to that approach."

For six days, Petraeus spent three to six hours a day negotiating lists of candidates for the council and governor. Some the group rejected outright. Petraeus personally interviewed all the credible candidates for governor, and eliminated those who did not meet the criteria. Three emerged as front-runners: Dr. Hudaifa Saeed Aldewachy, a pathologist; former Army Major General Ghanim Sultan al Basso, a former Baath Party member who had commanded the Third Corps and been wounded six times in the war with Iran, but who had been forcibly retired in 1993 (and under house arrest since then) after Sad dam executed his brother and cousin for treason; and retired police Major General Tarik Almuteb, also formerly of the Baath Party.

Numerous election-related issues arose, which Petraeus settled. The representative of the Kurdish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) party, for example, wanted more delegates. Petraeus pointed out that he would never get more than the powerful Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) with its large Nineveh following; the inescapable reality was that the KDP would appoint the Kurdish vice governor. "Let's knock it off," Petraeus told him. "Actually, it was a little bit more emotional and dramatic than that." Then there were numerous details—apparently petty but heavily symbolic—which the 101st also handled. Soldiers, for example, designed the invitation for delegates to the convention. To make it look official, they crimped it with the division staff judge advocate's notary seal.

Lawyers, Translators Valuable. Throughout the election period, Petraeus depended on his staff judge advocate, Colonel Richard O. Hatch, and Hatch's team of lawyers to guide and ground the process. Petraeus admired and collected legal staff—which numbered at their height 27 lawyers. These included divisional lawyers, plus some assigned to the 101st home base (Fort Campbell), as well as a few from various Army legal commands. "I took as many lawyers as we could," he explains, "and then made deals to get more because you're always after resources that can enable you, and they are among key enablers."

"I knew the value of lawyers already from Haiti and Bosnia... Operational lawyers are enormously important because what you're looking for is more capability, and they represent just that. You can throw them at a problem and they figure out how to solve it... They are smart, hard working, and think and write in a structured way."

He also relied heavily on translators, some of them Arab-Americans but many of them English-language students or instructors from Mosul University. "Interpreters are absolutely vital," he says.

Election Day

On Monday, May 5, the 250-plus delegates from nine ethnic groups gathered at the Mosul Social Club, a building in a residential neighborhood. The delegates voted for 24 council members, who were then sworn in by Mosul's chief judge standing on a podium under an Iraqi flag. Petraeus sat on the podium. It was a representative group. From Mosul came seven Arabs, three Kurds, two Assyrian Christians, a Turkmen, and a Shabak; from outside Mosul, six Arabs, a Yezidi, and an Assyrian Christian, plus two former generals.
The council members then chose as governor former Major General Al Basso. Kurd Khasro Goran became deputy governor, while an Assyrian Christian and a Turkmen served as assistant governors. Those four, plus the council, had full powers to govern Mosul and the surrounding Nineveh Province. The 101st officially handed over the reins of government to the council on Saturday, May 10. Aware of the importance of appearance as well as substance, Petraeus had reclaimed the Nineveh governorate building for the governor and had it refurbished with coalition money by Iraqi contractors. By the ribbon cutting on Saturday, the governor's suite was ready for occupancy.

Almost immediately, criticisms arose of the election process. One of the most frequent Iraqi complaints was that several former Saddam supporters had been elected. Council member and Imam Sheikh Salah Khalil Hamoody, for example, was a cousin of the former defense minister. As recently as March, he had issued a fatwa (religious decree) to Muslims to fight US forces. Petraeus recognized that suspect individuals may have made it onto the council. But all candidates had signed forms expressly denouncing the Baath Party, and Petraeus and others were keeping a watchful eye on those with ties to the former ruling party. In the case of Sheikh Salah, Petraeus had confronted the imam about his previous activities, but was assured they were all performed under duress, that the sheikh celebrated the end of Saddam's regime, and that he supported efforts to build a new Iraq.

As for American critics—in Baghdad and elsewhere—some worried that the election might prove to have been too much too fast. A few detractors muttered that Petraeus, driven by his instinct to win, was simply trying to be first with elections for the sake of it. No one, however, accused Petraeus of breaking orders or taking significant actions without consulting V Corps headquarters in Baghdad. As Brigadier General Frank Helmick, who replaced Freakley as ADC-O, commented: "Nobody told us to do (elections), but nobody told us not to do it, either." Colonel Michael Meese—who served as special advisor to Petraeus from June to August 2003—made the case for moving with dispatch: "Do you want to have an 80 percent solution in a month, or wait a year for the 100 percent solution?" Petraeus agrees:

At a certain point, we realized we'd gotten about as good a feel as we were going to for a few months anyway. We explicitly called this an interim government, and we knew we could always make changes later on down the road. It was time to just get on with it.

The election could have been delayed, acknowledges Petraeus. But, he argues, "you need to do stuff while you're omnipotent."

You have to jump through windows of opportunity and exploit windows of opportunity while they're open, and not study them until they start to close, and then try to wriggle through or force them back open.

Petraeus remained convinced that there was no alternative to handing over authority to Iraqis as swiftly as possible so that they could help with the decision making on local issues. The worst that could happen, he reasoned, was it would not go well and would have to be redone. The best outcome would be to "get Iraqis helping solve Iraqi problems and feeling that they were part of the way ahead." He remembers with satisfaction the first day the governor was in office, when an aide approached the two of them and said, "General, you've got a problem." Petraeus turned and said, "No, the governor has a problem." The governor responded, "No, we have a problem."

The next step: elections in the districts within the 101st sector. Although there would be a pause while awaiting approval from CPA (which replaced ORHA in mid-May) to hold additional elections, come the summer 101st units helped Iraqis hold elections in each district; created three regional councils to pull
together political, religious, tribal and security leaders; and even hosted meetings of leaders of the six northern Iraq provinces.28

Running a City/Province

But staging elections was only one small part of what Petraeus and his staff confronted. They had become, in effect, the civil administration of Mosul and Nineveh. This vacuum existed because the administrative infrastructure which the US post-hostilities plan had counted on reactivating had vanished as senior Iraqi officials abandoned their posts--both military and civilian. ORHA North continued small, ineffective and remote. Its staff (retired Army Colonel Richard Nabb had replaced General Moore as coordinator) delayed ineffective administrative coordination; the clearinghouse (CMOC) was never effective. Educated by the experience of the Sunni uprising, Petraeus was the governor of Nineveh and I was the mayor of Mosul.30 They confronted dozens of urgent tasks. To coordinate them all, Anderson decided to locate what was known as a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in the old Provincial Hall.31 A CMOC dealt with civilian concerns--fielding complaints, distributing information, answering questions. The CMOC was intended to serve as a clearinghouse until such time as the US authorities in Baghdad put something else in place. Anderson had the CMOC up and running within 72 hours--a considerable feat given that the building had been gutted and looted. There he located 12 or so civil affairs functional experts: on sanitation, water, health, education and so forth. Anderson also turned for expertise to UN agencies with offices in the region, such as UNICEF, UNESCO and the World Food Program. Together with them, US military-civil affairs teams worked to identify solutions to the most urgent problems. But the jobs were overwhelming, and new ones emerged daily. As Petraeus puts it: "We had to adjust constantly."

Restoring Normalcy. As early as Friday, April 25, division troops working with local Iraqis had restarted electricity and water and were trying to reopen schools. Army engineers cleared rubble from the streets. They repaired runways. They picked up trash. A designated Regional Information Center helped citizens learn which hospitals were open, how to find carpools, where to locate mosques, how to access international aid and so forth.32

By April 27, limited gasoline and propane deliveries began. They were not enough, however. Despite the fact that Iraq had the second largest oil reserves in the world, supplies had been severely disrupted by the war and by sabotage. On May 5, Petraeus estimated that Mosul had only a five-day supply of gasoline; lines were two days long. To stretch out supplies, and maintain order, Petraeus assigned troops to guard nine Iraqi government-owned gas stations. Iraqi attendants pumped the gas, while soldiers directed traffic and enforced a rule that restricted service to odd-numbered license plates on odd-numbered days and vice versa. They watched for price gouging. At an area refinery, soldiers protected the trucks that brought in oil, and stood guard when propane (used for cooking as well as heating) was distributed.33

Besides protecting existing stores of gas and propane, Petraeus also found a way to increase supplies-by turning to an Iraqi neighbor. He arranged for stepped-up deliveries of gas and propane from Turkey, and brought in a US Army officer to oversee it.34 By May 18, 55 truckloads a day crossed the border, and the number would grow dramatically over the following weeks.

Joint Patrols and Security
Then there was security. All the civil affairs and reconstruction initiatives in the world would fail if citizens could not feel secure in the city and province. In Mosul, Petraeus directed his soldiers to launch what he called "Presence Patrols"--Humvees and thousands of infantrymen patrolling the streets in a show of law and order. The general ordered a low-key approach -- no US flags were to fly from vehicles.

But Petraeus wanted to make it clear that public safety was a shared goal. That meant Iraqi police on the streets as well. Petraeus was aware the Iraqi police had a bad reputation, and he did discuss with his staff the wisdom of putting them back on the street. But seeing Iraqi police directing traffic and doing other tasks would contribute, he hoped, to a general sense of normalcy. "The decision was, 'Let's see what we've got, get them out there, get rid of the deadwood, and see who is willing to work'," recalls the chief division lawyer, Judge Advocate Hatch. So on Saturday, April 26, the newly appointed Mosul police chief, General Abdullah Aziz, announced that joint patrols--both in cars and on foot--between his 2,500 remaining police officers and US forces would start that day. The message, says Petraeus, was: "We walk." The joint patrols, says battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel William Hickman, demonstrated that "we weren't an army of occupation; we were an army of liberation. We're not there to take control of Mosul. We're there to work with your local authorities to build Mosul into something better.

To take the measure of the existing police force, Colonel Anderson dispatched his battalion commanders to spend time with each police precinct chief, take him along on patrol to model how the US did it, and develop a plan for joint daily patrols. US military police were sent to work at each police station--"they were not left alone," says Anderson. The 101st observed that older Iraqi police, in particular, were often content to stand by and do little, drinking tea or talking rather than policing. So the division established a 10-point code of conduct for police; violation meant dismissal. Finally, at the end of May, military police battalion commander Wade Dennis used a military police training detachment provided to the 101st to open a three-week academy to retrain returning police officers. The curriculum included classes on human rights, traffic control, investigative crime scene procedures and so forth. To give the police a new look, and help distinguish them from their brutal and corrupt predecessors, the division also provided newly designed uniforms.

The decision to use existing police forces initially ran afoul of ORHA. The US civil administration wanted to fire all police and recruit new officers from scratch in order to avoid even the appearance of any lingering Baathist influence among the long-distrusted Iraqi police. In Washington and Baghdad, US civilian authorities hammered out with exhausting precision standards for police re-hiring and retention. But Petraeus and his commanders believed that a top down, one-size-fits-all approach to police personnel was not right for all locations. In Mosul, Petraeus chose to retain police willing to undergo retraining, renounce the Baath Party, and work hard. Besides, ORHA had provided no specific instructions, much less money, equipment, uniforms, vehicles, weapons or ammunition. The 101st provided those items on its own.

Petraeus did have to correct course occasionally. In Mosul, Anderson twice during the early months had to ask the governor to replace the police chief before a competent and principled chief was selected. A number of precinct chiefs were also dismissed.

Curbing the Kurds. While they were strengthening the ordinary police, the 101st faced an immediate need simultaneously to rein in Kurdish security forces. Further north, the Kurds for 12 years had enjoyed self-rule in the wake of the first Gulf War. With the second war, the Kurds sought to extend their security forces into parts of Nineveh province they considered within their area of control. Kurdish flags flew in Mosul, as well as other cities. More importantly, the Kurds deployed into Nineveh tough soldiers known as peshmerga, who ran armed patrols and manned checkpoints. Kurds staged mass rallies outside the private compounds they maintained. They seized hundreds of vehicles--not only police
and military ones but private cars and trucks as well. In some areas outside Mosul, Arabs complained that Kurds were forcibly driving them off the land, claiming ownership.

Handling the Kurds was a tricky matter. They had been US allies for a decade and of particular assistance during the invasion. "There was a very interesting relationship there," comments Anderson, "so you had to be careful." But now their trained militias and firepower were disproportionate and unsettling to other members of society. Petraeus had to balance the interests of the province as a whole and its many ethnic groups against the need to reward the Kurds. He also had to balance the demands of the two Kurdish parties: the KDP (led by Massoud Barzani) and the PUK (led by Jalal Talabani). Though "brother" Kurds, the two factions had fought a bitter civil war in 1995, and there was substantial lingering rivalry between them.

With that in mind, on Sunday, April 27, Colonel Anderson and Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Holden met with local Kurd representatives--two from the KDP and two from the PUK. The Americans were respectful but forceful: they informed the Kurds that the semi autonomy they had grown accustomed to exercising south of the "Green Line" (the former boundary between the Sunni Arab --art of northern Iraq and the Kurdish area) would no longer be tolerated. The Americans also told the Kurds that there would be no more independent patrols, and that the checkpoints would be dismantled.

Peshmerga were consolidated into 10 locations within Mosul. The 101st limited Kurdish armed militias to one security detail and 10 bodyguards per top leader. The Kurds also agreed to a commission of inquiry to resolve land disputes, and promised not to reclaim more land until the creation of a national property compensation process. But the Kurdish issue did not go away. In July, and again in September, Colonel Anderson evicted them from two Mosul locations after shooting erupted.

Petraeus had running conversations with his commanders about whether, given the ever improving relations with other Iraqi groups, the Kurds enjoyed too much favor from US forces. There was no single right answer. Nonetheless, the relationship was carefully nurtured. Petraeus himself met at least once a month with the two major Kurdish leaders, Barzani and Talabani (who both had powerful allies at ORHA/CP A), and assigned them permanent liaison officers. The Kurds, he learned, felt slighted that--despite their demonstrated loyalty to the coalition forces--they had received what they considered only a minor allocation of reconstruction funds. So Petraeus ensured that substantial construction projects took place in their areas. Notably, he sent two engineer battalions to expand airfields, and helped the Kurds train and equip border guards, train civil defense forces, rebuild schools, and complete various water projects. Given the historic rivalry between the two parties, Petraeus was careful to do for the other what he did for the one.

**Battle Rhythm**

To manage the different and competing demands on his time and attention, Petraeus emphasized the importance of a daily routine, or "battle rhythm." In nation building, many of the battles were not military, but civilian. He and his soldiers were working 16-to-18 hour days, seven days a week. His own day started with a quick glance at email at 5:15 a.m., followed by a run and workout at 5:45 a.m. with the division operations officer and a handful of others, who updated Petraeus on events overnight. Petraeus and his operations officer discussed developments, brainstormed, and reviewed upcoming events as they ran the four-mile perimeter of the division compound. "If [the run] turned competitive on occasion," notes Petraeus, who was renowned for his competitive spirit, "then we'd stop talking."

That was followed by a commanders' update at 7:00 a.m. This was the daily occasion that Petraeus used to talk with his subordinate commanders, share his sense of the situation, hear their assessments and initiatives, and, set the course for the division. Some 15 commanders in the division reported in by
satellite radio, including commanders from the three infantry brigades, two aviation brigades, divisional artillery, division support command, corps support group, engineers, military intelligence, and signal. The two assistant division commanders also joined in, as well as various liaison officers working with the Nineveh province governor, the Kurds, Turkish border officials and the division's higher headquarters in Baghdad. During this hour-long call, commanders described what had happened during the preceding 24 hours, and what they intended to do over the next 24 hours. They often shared good ideas and lessons learned what they called TTP--tactics, techniques and procedures.43 Recalls Petraeus:

“It gave everybody a sense of what was going on everywhere else, and that was very important because obviously problems can cross boundaries.”

During these calls Petraeus occasionally conducted what he wryly calls "a little bit of cross examination," grilling his commanders gently to keep them on their toes. But he emphasized good humor and a team spirit. Often he focused on details, such as urging his commanders to get the troops to wave more at Iraqi citizens, or to inform Iraqis living near night raids what had been done and why. Often he embraced his officers' own imaginative, problem-solving ideas. 1st Brigade commander Colonel Hodges, for example, conceived of the first annual Tigris River Valley "sheikh fest"--and Petraeus enthusiastically promoted it.

The fest was an attempt early in the division's tenure to correct a mix-up. A sheikh had asked Petraeus to stop soldiers wearing sunglasses that--as the sheikh thought--allowed them to see through women's clothing, as well as night goggles which the sheikh believed could look through walls. To clear up the confusion, Hodges and Petraeus decided to invite the more-than-50 area sheikhs into an aircraft hangar at the Qayyarah airfield for a banquet, and to then encourage them to sit in every aircraft and every vehicle, look through the sunglasses, and don the goggles. The result was a party for all, and one misunderstanding cleared up. The gathering also had long term consequences, evolving into the Tigris River Valley Council--which was then copied by the 2nd and 3rd Brigade commanders in their regions of Nineveh.

Petraeus frequently turned for advice and debate to a small group of individuals whom he trusted and admired. "His infantry brigade commanders were gold," recalls Chief of Staff Colonel Schoenbeck. "He wanted to hear the opinions, the arguments, [and] the discussions from a very small circle of individuals." Petraeus respected disagreement as well. "He and I could disagree on just about everything," laughs Schoenbeck, "and we would know that the answer was somewhere in between us somewhere.44 Petraeus in turn respected Schoenbeck for his ability to "synthesize the views of competing commanders, discuss them dispassionately, and provide a well-reasoned recommendation."

Several times a week, Petraeus met after the morning update with planners and other staff members. By mid-morning at the latest, however, he would be in a helicopter or Humvee headed out to visit units, walk patrols, meet Iraqi leaders, hear from brigades about upcoming operations, attend a ribbon-cutting or graduation ceremony, welcome visitors from Baghdad or the US (including a large number of congressional delegations), and attend Province Council meetings.

At the end of every day, Petraeus received a division staff update of 45 minutes to an hour. Some 50 to 100 division staff assembled at 5:00 p.m. in a large room in the division's main command post to review the day's events, the status of important programs, and plans for the near future. While the morning update focused on activities of the division's subordinate units, this meeting highlighted programs overseen by division staff. Both meetings allowed Petraeus to keep the division in synch with his priorities. At 6:00 p.m., Petraeus took part in a daily conference call with his boss--at first V Corps Commander Lieutenant General William Scott Wallace, and then from June 14 Wallace's successor, Lieutenant General Ricardo A. Sanchez.45 Following that, he met with staff members, attended dinners with Iraqis throughout the north or at his headquarters, and caught up on email.46
While the battle rhythm helped to organize the chaos that characterized the early days in Mosul, and to provide operational coherence, the meetings served a purpose beyond logistics. They gave Petraeus an opportunity to establish a common culture and approach for all sectors of the division--to set a tone.

Setting a Tone

Petraeus had to set the tone for a lot of constituencies. First and foremost, for his subordinate commanders, but also for the troops they led and finally--in this setting--for the Iraqis. "Tone," says Petraeus, "is critical, and the commander sets the tone. Not the ADCs (assistant division commanders), not the brigade commanders, not the staff."

"This is about leadership. This type of endeavor is commander-centric, not staff-centric... It's not an endeavor where the staff tends to have a lot of idle time on its hands and bubbles up lots of ideas to the boss... It really is a situation, in which the commanders dream stuff up and develop the vision, and then their staffs turn it into coherent orders and the units carry them out."[47]

Attitude, in his view, counted for a lot. "Optimism and enthusiasm are force multipliers," he says, "and they're very, very important in this kind of thing. You may not like the term politician--I don't--but it is as if you are running for office all the time." At the same time, he wanted to establish a culture of respect for those the US Army had come to help the Iraqis. "If you come into Iraq only looking for a fight," he says, "that may be all you'll find--because there are plenty of fights. You have to be looking for the opportunities to make peace as well."

Petraeus tried to help his soldiers avoid opportunities for a fight--or at least avoid making snap decisions with major consequences. A concept called "strategic corporal" refers to any soldier whose actions have potentially strategic consequences. Checkpoints, for example--with their high tension and demands for instant decisions--were prime candidates for creating strategic corporal situations. Petraeus consistently tried to reduce the likelihood of a strategic corporal incident by establishing procedures to maximize the amount of time available to make a life or death decision. He watched his own behavior as well, occasionally asking himself: "Before I blow up at this meeting, am I now a strategic corporal?"

Flyers posted around 101st command posts, barracks and dining halls reinforced his message. One poster read: "We are in a race to win over the people. What have you and your element done today to contribute to victory?"[48] Another one said: "What have you done to win Iraqi hearts and minds today?" General Petraeus consistently encouraged and rewarded soldiers' initiative. "The 101st was a big flashlight shining into every dark corner saying what can we turn around, what can we fix, what can we make better?" comments ADC Freakley. "That permeated from the commanding general all the way down to the battalion commander level, trying to get normalcy restored."

Principles. What made post-conflict Iraq tricky was that while encouraging soldiers' respect for Iraqis was laudable, hostilities were ongoing. The military had to be constantly alert to armed threats from Baath-party loyalists or insurgents. At the same time, US forces were trying to help establish a new system for peaceful Iraq--a new economy, new government and new civil society. Over the course of his first three months in Mosul, Petraeus developed a couple of operating principles to try to maintain this delicate balance. The first one was: "We need to create as many Iraqis as possible who have a stake in the success of the new Iraq." Success would mean a constituency willing to back the Americans and the new Iraq, willing to identify and help battle insurgents trying to establish a presence in the north. "We were trying," he amplifies, "to develop constructive relationships with the people constantly. Engagement was a huge part of that." The choice, he had realized, was stark:
“You either have to kill or capture [enemies], or you've got to do something to get them to have a stake in the success of the new Iraq. One or the other. There's not an in-between.”

A second principle was: "You must show progress. The way you win consent is by earning it, by showing that life is getting better." He hoped to establish a sense of normalcy, to reach a point where people obeyed laws not at the barrel of a gun, but because it was the law. "When order breaks down, obviously you've got a real challenge on your hands," he observes. "And order had broken down in Iraq because all the security forces, really all the officials of every ministry, just went to ground, and the senior levels left."

A third guiding principle applied to the security arena. It was: "Don't conduct an operation unless it will take more bad guys off the streets than it creates." If an operation did not meet that standard, Petraeus says, "you really need to look hard at the value of what you're doing." With time, Petraeus says, his understanding evolved beyond hoping Iraqis would admire the Americans for their own sake. "The truth is," he states, "that culturally, historically, many will not love us. What we want is for them to feel a stake in the success of the new Iraq."

**Model for Iraqis.** At the same time, Petraeus had to be mindful of the example he was setting for Iraqis. He found himself engaged far more closely with local Iraqi leaders than he had anticipated. So he began to develop a philosophy for such interactions. "You have to take things personally," he says. "You have to have passion."

"I do believe that occasionally you have to show the full range of emotions--though you generally have to have almost inexhaustible patience in dealing with Iraqis... But you have to show at some points in time that there are limits ... [At the same time,] you can't do something that is non-biodegradable, something that destroys somebody's honor and your relationship with that person for life.”

During the election negotiations, for example, Petraeus at one point slammed the table, exclaiming, "That's it, that's enough! We're not going to start each morning's discussion with various individuals trying to renegotiate what we agreed to yesterday. I will not tolerate that." The Iraqis, realizing they had angered Petraeus, sought to calm him down and prevent him from leaving the table. Sometimes, muses Petraeus, "you have to force people to work together. Non-cooperation was not an option." At the same time, Petraeus realized that "occasionally you have to apologize As a leader, this stuff matters. This is really the most deadly serious endeavor you can think of."

His principles, then, provided a framework for action. To make real progress, however, Petraeus realized that he would have to convince his own troops to undertake a different kind of work than the fighting for which they had trained. It was time to assign responsibilities. In this, Petraeus was following directives for the entire V Corps. On May 16, the original CMO strategy of mid-April was updated to reflect the on-the-ground reality facing the military: a rising insurgency, rampant crime, decayed or destroyed infrastructure, a fractured polity torn by ethnic and tribal rivalries—and a very slow start by the US civilian administration.

The V Corps goal "Provide a Secure Environment" thus became "Create a Secure Environment"; "Restore Basic Life Services" was now "Support Economic Development"; and "Restore Civil Governments" became "Facilitating the Establishment of Local Governments." Each goal had numerous key tasks, which included establishing a new Iraqi army, improving basic public services, restoring the fuel distribution system, fostering economic growth, and establishing government bodies plus a civil society. So Petraeus and his fellow division Commanders had their marching orders—but not much guidance on how to get it done.
Who Runs What?

To restart numerous institutions and industries in Mosul and Nineveh, Petraeus decided to assign his commanders and units specific tasks. At first, he had hoped the Civil Affairs (CA) units could run things. The 101st had been assigned an unprecedented two civil affairs battalions, totaling nearly 1,000 soldiers. The CA personnel were, he says, "really good at certain civil tasks and trained to do them, where our guys, of course, were trained to fly helicopters, shoot rifles, and fight." But the Civil Affairs personnel were few in number compared to the tasks at hand.

Nor did CA officers have, in key cases, the necessary rank and breadth of experience. The small CA team (less than 10 soldiers) assigned to work with the Mosul University chancellor, for example, was led by a young female captain, a one-time elementary school teacher. In Iraq, notes Petraeus, "age and credentials are very important."

All these guys were in their late 50s or 60s, had studied outside the country, earned PhDs in the UK and the US ... So you really had to wonder how easy it was going to be for a young captain to help the chancellor of a 35,000-student university--with 18 or 19 colleges--get this thing going again.

Similarly small CA teams were intended to manage other areas. "That's when we hit on the idea that what we needed to do was assign a unit to every single ministry activity that we could," says Petraeus.

In mid-May, the assignments began. To the degree possible, Petraeus took advantage of existing expertise. "A division is, in a sense, a microcosm of society," he says. "What you've got to do is assign an organization, a commander, responsibility." Thus, Petraeus himself took responsibility for dealing with the governor and the two senior Kurdish leaders. An aviation brigade commander, a colonel, was dispatched to resurrect the university. "He had a big staff; numerous helicopters, lots of vehicles, contracting officers, you name it--he could make things happen," says Petraeus. Unsuspected talents emerged within the brigade. An aviation warrant officer who was a former network systems technician helped rewire the university computer system. Another proved a good carpenter. "What we had as an overall organization," says Petraeus, "was enormous capability and capacity."

All we needed was the enabling resource of money, some overarching policy guidance in the various functional areas, occasional technical expertise--and that was about it.

Other units were assigned to partner with various ministry activities or oversee particular functions. The Division Support Command, for example, took the "youth and sports" ministry portfolio; it eventually sponsored over 100 soccer teams, rebuilt the Olympic swimming facility and repaired other athletic facilities and an amusement park. The Corps Support Command assisted the regular education ministry. The assistant division commander for support, who spoke Arabic, worked as liaison for the mukhtars (neighborhood clerks) in Mosul. ADC Freakley (succeeded in June by Brigadier General Frank Helmick) was mad. "Mr. Oil"--"We had our own little oil infrastructure team, and he was the head of that one," recalls Petraeus. General Helmick also took on relations with retired generals. "I finally had to give that up to Frank," Petraeus recalls somewhat ruefully. "My patience with the retired generals had begun to run thin after about the first three months."

In other examples, the signal battalion commander partnered with the director general of the telecommunications ministry to rebuild the communications infrastructure in northern Iraq. The 101st even persuaded the US company Bell South to donate hundreds of kilometers of "fiber optic cables, which the division used to rewire the north of the country. The division chaplain worked with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, headed by a senior Sunni Arab imam. He also helped create an interfaith
council to bring together all religious leaders. The Division Engineer battalion partnered with the Ministry of Public Works; the Division Artillery helped create a veterans employment center. Staff Judge Advocate Hatch helped the Justice Ministry reestablish its judicial center. The division's surgeon worked with the ministry of health director general. Several units worked on training Iraqi security forces. The list went on and on. Emphasizes Petraeus:

“There was somebody responsible for everything. If you said sports, I knew who it was. If you said religion, if you said communications, police, higher education, regular education, oil, agriculture--you name it, there was someone who was responsible.”

Each commanding officer used available Civil Affairs soldiers in addition to their own troops, but the commander remained responsible for progress. It was quite an education. Notes Petraeus:

“We learned an enormous amount of what seems like trivia about a number of major industries--about the oil industry, about various ways to generate electricity, about water treatment plants, about cement plants, sulfur plants, irrigation systems, the harvesting and pricing of wheat, asphalt factories. We learned what was necessary to enable us to help the Iraqis solve some of these problems.”

Not all officers or soldiers were enamored of these civilian assignments. A few, recalls Petraeus, objected that "we're Screaming Eagles, we're Airborne Rangers. We don't want to spend all day sitting around in tents or community halls drinking tea with sheikhs." Petraeus sympathized to a degree; the political meetings, he conceded, were "really painful. The haranguing, and the lecturing, and the history lessons, and all the rest of that" But there was no choice: the big challenge was reconstruction which, done right, might reduce the fighting. To officers reluctant to embrace nation-building tasks, Petraeus made it clear that "this isn't optional. At the end of the day, if an officer wants to command another fighting unit in the future, he's going to have to do some non-fighting today."

Quick to Correct.

With so many activities underway, Petraeus recognized that sometimes things would go wrong. When they did, he believed it was essential to move swiftly to correct matters, learn from them, and move on. "When you do something wrong--hurt a civilian or mistreat a sheikh--you must immediately take action to ensure such errors don't have strategic consequences," he says. In one instance, when a sheikh complained that his car had been confiscated, a lieutenant lied and claimed it had not. When the lie was discovered, the sheikh was given an apology and compensated, disciplinary action was taken against the leaders involved and the case was used in the division to instruct others. In July 2003, 101st troops mistakenly called in a helicopter gun run against a Kurdish stronghold in Mosul after peshmerga unwittingly shot at US forces patrolling the river at night. Petraeus moved swiftly to apologize for the errors on the US side and involved KDP leader Barzani in restoring calm. Beyond that, Petraeus believed the division should pay its way when it caused damage or used services. Sometimes it went to great lengths to do so. As far back as the battle for An Najaf in late March, the 2nd Brigade had consumed thousands of bottles of cola from a factory in the town of Kufa. Two months later, the brigade tracked down the manager of the cola factory and sent a lawyer to pay the $25,000 bill. "If you want to reestablish the rule of law," says Petraeus, "you have to set the example by obeying the laws yourself and ensuring that your unit members do likewise."

At the same time, Petraeus and his team began to realize that their forces would not be welcome forever. There would be too much traffic disruption or one too many errant ammunition rounds, or too many low helicopter flights. "We called it the half life," he says.
“We wanted to be seen as an army of liberation rather than an army of occupation. But we knew from experience and intuitively that any army of liberation has a "half-life" before it becomes an army of occupation ... What we wanted to do was extend that half-life as long as we could by our actions--by community projects, public affairs, ceremonies celebrating progress and so on. That fact kept us doing as much as possible as quickly as we could.”

For the first few months, at least, there were seemingly endless opportunities for actions that demonstrated good US intentions. Petraeus simultaneously found ways to pay civil servants, reopen the border with Syria, restart a cement factory, fix irrigation systems, repair a refinery, establish a military employment center, and train former soldiers and more.

**Projects Galore**

**Back Pay.** Under Saddam, the government had employed the vast majority of Iraqis. With the war, no salaries had been paid for weeks. By early May, this had become a serious problem across Iraq for the country's 1.4 million civil servants. In Mosul, there seemed to be literally no money with which to pay them, because the central bank had been looted and burned to the ground in April. The term bank was, in any event, misleading. Under Saddam, banks 'conducted no commercial activities. They were essentially holding facilities for safekeeping cash transported from Baghdad's ministry of finance to pay for ministry activities in the provinces. There was no longer a functioning ministry of finance, either.

But Petraeus had heard that there might be a large sum of cash in another Mosul bank. Petraeus summoned the bank's former director general, who confirmed he had hidden a substantial sum--enough to pay the government workers' salaries. But the bank director objected that he had no authority to release the money--only the minister of finance could do that. When Petraeus pointed out that there was no longer either a minister or a ministry, the director general speculated that Petraeus might have the authority now. So the US general grabbed a piece of two star Army stationery and wrote an order directing the man to use the money to pay the workers. The director general worried because the document was not stamped--proof of authenticity in Saddam's Iraq. So Judge Advocate Hatch reached for his notary public seal and all were satisfied. The next day, Petraeus sent his aide into the local market to buy an inkpad and order a suitably gaudy stamp--which was used regularly after that.

To his relief, Petraeus was not required to act as paymaster for long. Later in May, CPA announced plans to pay civil servants nationwide; the first disbursements were made on May 24. Half of those paid received raises: teachers' pay rose from $20 to $100 a month, while police salaries doubled to $100 a month. Military and intelligence service employees, however, got nothing.

**Reopening Border.** But resolving Mosul's public salary dilemma created, Petraeus quickly realized, another potential problem: inflation. Without additional goods to buy, the soon-to-be paid salaries would simply create conditions for higher prices. Petraeus found himself falling back on his stint as an economics instructor at West Point. He explains:

“If all we do is inject more money into a closed economy, i.e., more money chasing a fixed amount of goods in the marketplace, the result will be higher prices--not more goods, more selection and so on... I literally woke up in the middle of the night and thought, 'My gosh, if we're going to inject more money without more goods, we're just going to create inflation.'”

This ran counter, he adds, to the desired objective, which was to "show progress. We needed to show that capitalism and free market economics produce greater choice, greater quality, greater opportunity and so forth.” Petraeus met with the governor to discuss how to get more goods into the market. One possible
solution emerged: increase trade with Iraq's neighbors. But the Turkish and Iranian border crossings--which were in the Kurdish region so remained open throughout the war--were already overburdened by existing vehicle flow (which was starting to include logistics convoys for the 101\textsuperscript{st}). The Syrian border, however, had been closed to prevent Saddam's henchmen from escaping. If Petraeus could reopen a Syrian border crossing to trade, then more goods would be available to soak up the excess currency and avoid a spike in prices.

Admittedly, there were problems. A UN Security Council embargo on Iraq was still in place. In addition, some members of the US Congress were not enthusiastic about measures that benefited Syria, a country considered hostile to US interests. Further (though Petraeus learned this only a year later), Secretary of State Colin Powell had told the Syrian government that under no circumstances would the border reopen any time soon. There was another option: do nothing. But Petraeus--when he consulted with them--heard from local businessmen and government border officials (customs, border police, passport office and so forth) that "nothing" was not acceptable.

The fact was that the closed border with Syria was contributing to Arab-Kurdish rivalry. In a longstanding arrangement, Kurds controlled--meaning they charged tariffs on goods crossing the border with Turkey. Arab sheikhs had traditionally done the same at the Syrian border, and now bemoaned the loss of income its closure caused them.\textsuperscript{55} "Petraeus was hearing a lot from the locals," confirms Judge Advocate Hatch, the division's senior lawyer. Hatch and the operations staff raised additional concerns with Petraeus: might wanted former regime leaders use a reopened border to escape into Syria? What about contraband and smuggling? Petraeus decided to find out first whether the border could be opened; then he'd consider whether it should be.

He put Hatch on the case, researching international legal agreements that governed trade with Iraq. Petraeus also consulted with his boss, Lieutenant General Wallace. Hatch concluded that Petraeus had the legal authority to open a border crossing. All through the night of May 5 (incidentally, the day of the Mosul election), Hatch worked on a draft order and promulgating instructions for border and customs officials. To address the sanctions concern, Hatch included a provision in the instructions which stipulated that they would "remain in effect for the duration of the current crisis or until superseded by higher authority.\textsuperscript{56} As for smuggling, Hatch specified that only "legal trade" could cross the border; sanctioned goods by definition were not legal and were listed in the instructions. Says Hatch: "The order was very prescribed and proscribed, very narrow."

Another problem was that the 101\textsuperscript{st} had no authority to negotiate an international agreement. So Hatch crafted the order as unilateral: instructions by a military commander ordering one side--the Iraqi one--of the border opened. To buttress the legal arguments, Hatch invoked an announcement by US Central Command Chief General Tommy R. Franks (who ran the Iraq invasion), in which Franks emphasized that, with the war over, normal trade was the goal--and surely open borders would facilitate that.

The staff also discussed the pitfalls of proceeding without a direct order from ORHA or other US authorities in Baghdad. But Petraeus was confident that, as the commanding officer on the ground, his decisions would be respected and supported. Moreover, as he and Hatch read the Geneva Convention, he had substantial responsibility for the security and wellbeing of the Iraqi people in his area of responsibility. As ADC Freakley puts it:

"General Petraeus in the northern part of Iraq was the decision maker, the guy trying to shape the northern part of Iraq, and he was told to go do that and stabilize that. So he was trying to stabilize the front along multiple lines of operations: oil, agriculture, trade, governance, policing functions. He kept looking for opportunities for success for the Iraqi people."
Recalls Hatch: "The decision was made that we'll tell (our higher headquarters), but we won't ask permission and we certainly won't wait for the State Department to get in here and figure it out." Petraeus kept General Wallace and ORHA fully informed--but he also took initiative. "The system was so lengthy to get approval, we just went ahead and ended up doing it," he recalls. The 101st did ask V Corps to forward a copy of the order to the State Department, which did not revoke it.

Petraeus signed an order resuming trade on May 6 (amended on May 8). It then took two days of intense but successful negotiations by 3rd Brigade commander Colonel Linnington (responsible for western Nineveh) with Iraqi customs and border officials, as well as area tribes, to reach formal agreement among all the parties. On May 13, Petraeus and Governor Al Basso jointly issued an order reopening the border crossing to Syria at Rubiyah. The first trucks rolled across within an hour of Petraeus handing a "diplomatic note" (notifying them of the reopening) to surprised Syrian border guards. That same afternoon, Iraqis--the governor, a leading sheikh from the border area, and a senior Iraqi customs official--cosigned with Petraeus promulgating instructions, which established transit fees ($10 for small trucks and $20 for larger ones). Under the agreement, the US would administer the customs post, but 50 members of local tribes would work there. The general and governor then attended a feast of 1,000 celebrating the border reopening, where Petraeus took care to eat with his hands like the rest of the celebrants. By October, some 500 to 700 trucks daily crossed back and forth to Syria.

Electricity Deal

Time after time, Petraeus found, one project bred another. For example, to rebuild housing required concrete. The manager of a concrete factory near the Syrian border was confident he could restart at least one of his production lines, but to run it continuously would require more electricity than was available. Nor was there enough electricity to meet the province's needs. An Iraqi told Petraeus that the province used to get electricity from Syria under a barter arrangement, in which oil from a small field in Nineveh was pumped into Syria in exchange for Syrian electricity. The provincial Iraqi oil officials still knew their counterparts on the Syrian side, and the infrastructure--the oil pipeline and the electrical lines--still existed, though repairs were needed. So Petraeus again put his lawyers and Brigade Commander Colonel Linnington on the job.

Linnington provided helicopters that ferried to negotiations the Iraqi director general for northern oil, electricity officials from Damascus, and the best of Petraeus' lawyers. For days they haggled, until the date approached for signing a deal. A ceremony was scheduled for Mosul in mid-summer. Syrian oil and electricity administrators were flown in from the border crossing, as were Iraqi state oil marketing representatives and electricity officials from Baghdad, plus a high ranking officer authorized to act on behalf of CPA. Assistant Division Commander General Helmick was to close the deal at a restaurant on the Tigris River, where Petraeus and the governor would join the group for a celebratory lunch before they all flew to the pumping station on the border to open the fuel valve.

But the lunch got cold as progress stalled completely over the prices to be assigned to either the oil or the electricity. The problem was that setting a benchmark price for both commodities was complex, and the Iraqi representatives in particular worried that it could set a precedent for future deals. General Helmick summoned Petraeus to break the logjam. Petraeus and the governor shuttled in vain between the Syrian and Iraqi delegations. "It was like dealing with kids that are trying to ask each other for a date," remembers Petraeus. "Neither would ask until each was sure the other would give the right answer." Neither side, it emerged, was confident it had the authority to make the deal final. Agreement, it seemed, was impossible.
Then inspiration hit: Petraeus proposed a solution which both sides, as well as the CPA official, accepted. All those gathered in Mosul would fly to the border area as planned. There the oil and power would be turned on, allowing the electricity to come east and the oil to flow west. An unofficial verbal agreement would set a benchmark of 4,500 barrels of oil per day for 53 megawatts of electricity, but the official price would be settled at leisure by the respective ministries in Baghdad and Damascus. Thus agreed, the parties flew in six helicopters to the border. There, in accordance with custom, they "slit a lamb's throat, we put our hands in the blood, we put our handprints on the pipe, and we turned the valve," recalls Petraeus. This arrangement worked for a long time, giving Nineveh more than enough electricity to power the cement factory at Sinjar.59

Media

Petraeus also had to decide what, if anything, to do with the media in Mosul. When the 101st arrived, only one television station--located near the university campus--was left functioning. The politician Mishaan Al Jabouri had taken effective control of the local news programming. The station also broadcast programs from the Arab television network Al-Jazeera, which was still airing pre-invasion appeals from Sad dam Hussein for Iraqis to rise up against the Americans. Petraeus moved quickly to remove Al Jabouri from influence. He ordered Station Manager Ahmed Jasim to cease cooperation with any political figures (although time was later provided for messages from gubernatorial candidates). He also stopped the AL-Jazeera feeds. As he put it: "Yes, what we are looking at is censorship, but you can censor something that is intended to inflame passions."60 Hatch wrote an order for Petraeus and the governor to sign, which laid out for the station manager the balance between free speech in Iraq and the occupying power's obligation under the Geneva Convention to maintain public order and safety.

The division restored and refurnished a number of media outlets. For example, it bought equipment for the functioning television station, and then re-opened and re-equipped the main Mosul TV station, which had been heavily looted. The 2nd brigade found on arrival that Mosul had only AM radio. The brigade moved the station to refurbished quarters, and then paid to upgrade it to be able to broadcast on an FM frequency to reach a wider audience.

After a few weeks, however, 101st commanders and the interim Province Council grew frustrated that positive news--such as a water treatment plant restoration or a school opening was rarely covered. "This wasn't trying to get it into the New York Times or the Washington Post," Petraeus clarifies. "This was trying to get the word out in northern Iraq." So he hired a couple of former Iraqi journalists, bought them trucks and TV cameras, and let them travel with 101st officers or Iraqi officials to ribbon-cutting ceremonies, political events and so forth. Their pieces went to Mosul TV --known as MTV--which was grateful for the local news. "I wouldn't call it propaganda," says Petraeus, "and we certainly weren't hiding who paid those journalists' salaries, but at least it got the word out to the people on what we were doing."

With time, the division became more sophisticated. The 22nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, attached to the 101st, developed pro-coalition broadcasting for radio as well as television stations.61 Petraeus also hired a producer and a couple of comedians to create a series of public service announcements for MTV known as Wakhazat (itch needs to be scratched), on topics from garbage disposal to obeying traffic rules. In the fall, he underwrote several programs, including a Mosul talent show (on the model of "American Idol") that proved unexpectedly popular. The military brass also became talk-show hosts. Petraeus sometimes hosted a TV call-in show; Colonel Anderson had his own Saturday morning radio show and for months hosted the nightly television news--at first every night. Eventually, Iraqi leaders followed suit. Although CPA in the fall encouraged television stations nationwide to adopt the programming it developed for its so--called Iraqi Media Network, the Mosul
stations chose to air their own programs much of the time as those remained the most popular with viewers.

Petraeus hoped the open airwaves would give Iraqis a voice--something they had rarely enjoyed. "Iraq in Saddam's day was a culture of chameleons," he notes, "and we were the new big guys."

Some of these folks had spent decades ingratiating themselves with whoever was in power. One of the things we tried was to foster more open, honest and real debate in the various political forums and on radio call-in shows and TV talk shows.

By many measures, the populace seemed to embrace its new-found freedom of speech and the trappings of democracy. By fall, there were 52 political parties, 24 newspapers and a radio station in addition to the television station. Newly reinstalled radio repeater antennas relayed the programs province-wide.

**De-Baathification and the Army**

Meanwhile, a pressing problem had ballooned since the 101st arrived in late April: what to do with the 110,000 former Iraqi army officers and soldiers living in northern Iraq. This was a national problem, but particularly urgent in Mosul because of the heavy concentration of former military. Its resolution was complicated by two decisions of the new ORHA administrator, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III--who in mid-May replaced the original ORHA chief, Lieutenant General (Retired) Garner.

Garner had been scheduled to remain until July 1. But during Garner's scant three weeks in control, the security situation had deteriorated alarmingly, with widespread looting and destruction of property. Criminal gangs had taken over parts of Baghdad, where electricity continued to be available only fleetingly. The retired general apparently had lost the confidence of both the civilian and the military US leadership. The Bush Administration called instead on Bremer, a State Department counterterrorism expert with a no-nonsense reputation, who arrived in Baghdad on Monday, May 12. On May 16, Bremer recast ORHA as CPA to "exercise powers of government temporarily." ORHA functions transferred to CPA over the next two weeks.62

**New Authority.** In short order, Ambassador Bremer on behalf of the Bush Administration announced two consequential decisions.63 On May 16, CPA Order No.1 banned from public office and government employment all senior members of the former Baath Party--some 30,000 officials.64 No former party member of Level 4 (firca) and above could serve in government.65 The order provided for" exceptions... on a case-by-case basis."66 Strong encouragement for this decision came from both America's Kurdish allies, who had been persecuted by the Baathists, and Iraqi exiles advising the US government. Moreover, Iraq was a Shi'a-majority country, and the Shiites had little love for the largely Sunni Baathists who had ruled the country under Saddam. The ban, proclaimed Bremer, "will ensure that representative government in Iraq is not threatened by Baathist elements returning to power and that those in positions of authority in the future are acceptable to the people of Iraq."67 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, elaborating on its merits, said the policy would make it clear that the US-led coalition intended to "eliminate the remnants of Saddam's regime."68

The US policy decision at a stroke eliminated from future public service many members of the Iraqi professional and managerial leadership. Although the Baath Party had included Saddam loyalists, not all Baathists--even at senior levels--were die-hard Saddam supporters. Party membership was a virtual requirement for reaching senior positions in Iraq, and any ambitious individual--including most teachers, professors and members of the security services--would have had to join. Many then rose over the years
to Level 4. Secretary Rumsfeld, however, had instructed Bremer that he wanted de-Baathification to proceed "even if implementing it causes administrative inconvenience."69

A week later, on May 23, Bremer announced a second key decision--to disband the army.70 A CPA statement explained why: "These actions are part of a robust campaign to show the Iraqi people that the Saddam regime is gone, and will never return."71 Soldiers were given one month's salary as severance pay; officers above the rank of colonel got nothing. As Bremer repeatedly observed, the Iraqi army had anyway effectively dissolved itself weeks earlier. To reconstitute it, he argued, was not an option: most of the soldiers were Shiite conscripts, while officers were Sunnis. He later elaborated:

"Any army that appeared to hand power back to a group of Sunni officers from the old days would surely be rejected by the Kurds and Shi'a who made up 80 percent of Iraq's population. It was a recipe for civil war."72

The results were striking. Officers and soldiers who had been respected members and leaders of their society found themselves overnight almost entirely dispossessed. The decision put on the streets some 375,000 now-unemployed soldiers, most of whom had taken their weapons home when their units melted away. CPA planned to create a new Iraqi army--professional, nonpolitical and broadly representative--under civilian control. But no timetable was announced.

There was considerable debate in US policy and military circles over the wisdom of banning senior Baath Party members and disbanding the military. Both measures, notes one author, were generally unpopular with the US military because the soldiers had to deal with the consequences on the ground.73 US commander of land forces in Iraq Lieutenant General David McKiernan, for example, acknowledged that unemployed soldiers posed "a concern not only from a security standpoint, but from an economic one."74 Bremer and other Bush Administration officials, however, defended the measures as the only sensible decisions.

Petraeus himself was of two minds. He could understand the argument for dissolution: the army was top heavy with officers (the senior ones Baathists), and its facilities had been largely destroyed. He agreed that Iraq probably did not need that army. "What would we have done with them?" he asks. "There were no barracks, no facilities, no supplies, equipment or vehicles for them. All that had been looted." On the other hand, flooding Iraqi society with unemployed soldiers had clear costs. As Petraeus puts it: "Disbanding the Army and de-Baathification created tens of thousands of people who no longer had a stake in the success of the new Iraq."

"In fact, without quick further action, they had a stake in the failure of the new Iraq. They'd gone from being the pillars of their community, to being outcasts. You've got to think that through."

Like his fellow commanders across Iraq, Petraeus' job now was to figure out how to implement Bremer's decisions. Understanding the reasoning behind a decision "doesn't mean," notes Petraeus wryly, "that we still didn't have to wrestle with the impact of those decisions." That, he emphasizes, was not an unusual situation for the military: "You spend your life dealing with decisions made by [other] people that have an impact on you in a unit. That is the whole idea behind civilian control of the military. What you have to do is be sure your boss understands the impact on your unit of a decision made above you."

In the weeks before the de-Baathification policy was announced, Petraeus had taken a different tack. He had tried to find acceptable ways to give capable Baath Party members without blood on their hands an incentive to cooperate with the US and support the new Iraq. The general decided, as a first step, to allow those who wanted a role in a different Iraq to disavow their earlier Baath allegiance. He had already done this before the May 5 election when--with approval from the division's higher headquarters--all
contenders for the Province Council signed a form (created by ORHA) denouncing the Baath Party. Additionally, Petraeus decided, at least on a temporary basis, to give some firca and above officials--former Baathists of convenience but not of conviction, who had the skills to help rebuild--the same opportunity. With no guidance from above, this seemed the sensible course. Taking decisions in a vacuum, says Petraeus, "is what commanders get paid to do--assess a situation, ensure you're within the general intent of your boss, make a decision, and get on with it."

But the flexibility commanders enjoyed before May 16 vanished with Bremer's new policy. Although in Mosul no one--given the opportunity for case-by-case appeals, which would take time--was fired on the spot, it was no longer possible to retain former high-ranking Baathists in government jobs. Nowhere did that restriction prove more troublesome than in the universities.

De-Baathification and the University

De-Baathification keenly affected Mosul University. Some 35,000 students enrolled at the university had been idle since the American invasion in March, when the school closed. Now attempts to reopen it were stymied because 153 faculty and 45 staff--roughly two-thirds of the total--were firca or above and thus barred from teaching. The Province Council, students, parents and faculty all urged the 101st to repair buildings and let the school year finish. Petraeus wanted to provide students the opportunity to take their exams and finish out the academic year--but how? He puzzled over his options.

One was to leave the university shuttered. But that choice held little appeal. Petraeus reasoned that a shutdown would only push more students--unoccupied and angry--into the arms of insurgents already causing problems in other parts of Iraq. He also explored with the university chancellor the possibility of scaling back classes, or using only "clean" professors. Neither seemed viable, and time was short. So again he turned to Judge Advocate Hatch, who came up with a compromise plan. This time, unlike the Syrian border crossing, it was clear Petraeus would have to get CPA's permission to proceed.

Bremer Visit. In mid-May the general had the opportunity to present his ideas to Ambassador Bremer, who visited Mosul on one of his first trips in-country. Bremer arrived on Sunday, May 18, and--to demonstrate civic normalcy--met with Mosul's governor, the provincial council, a police chief and a judge. Petraeus walked the streets with Bremer and gave the ambassador a helicopter tour of Mosul.

During the ride, he told Bremer that he needed to provisionally rehire senior university faculty so that they could administer final exams and students could graduate. Anyone provisionally rehired would have to sign a statement renouncing the Baath Party. "We were a little bold," says Hatch, "in saying we'll follow that directive [to fire senior Baathists], but we had an obligation to educate, and we'd already agreed with the governor to finish out the school year... We didn't need another couple of thousand disaffected young people." To Petraeus' satisfaction, Bremer gave his permission.

But Petraeus had a second idea. He wanted to establish a reconciliation commission of senior non-Baathist Iraqis to consider whether firca-and-above level former Baathist professors could be permanently rehired. A senior judge would chair the commission. Any academic who wanted to be considered for permanent re-hire could present his/her case to the commission. Bremer was willing to consider the proposal, but could not give a decision on the spot.

A final decision took longer than Petraeus had hoped. After briefing Bremer, Petraeus had sent his proposal to the CPA staff, V Corps staff and General Wallace and, via the university chancellor, to the Ministry of Education. In early June, he followed up with General Wallace (replaced June 14 by General Sanchez), asking for help in getting authorization to allow Iraqis to form the commission. Still there was no word.
On June 27, Petraeus was preparing to tell the Mosul University chancellor that he had failed to obtain approval for his plan, and all professors would have to be fired after final exams were over. But 10 minutes before he met the chancellor, Petraeus got a cell phone call from General Sanchez's political advisor, a civilian official who was the V Corps liaison to CPA. Petraeus had won a reprieve for university faculty. First of all, the 101st could continue the temporary exception for academics and offer professors provisional employment at least through the end of August. Second, Petraeus could convene a reconciliation commission.

Petraeus and Hatch's successor, Judge Advocate Colonel Richard Whitaker, worked to help the Iraqis quickly establish a commission under the Ministry of Higher Education. Its members were respected non-Baathist Iraqis, a few of them from the university. Their job was to vet former professors. After reviewing faculty biographies and qualifications, the commission recommended rehiring some 60 percent on a provisional basis (once they'd signed another renunciation letter). They would not be eligible for leadership positions in colleges or departments. The remaining 40 percent were either hired for lesser positions than before, or allowed to retire with a pension. Only one or two were fired outright. The chancellor, following CPA instructions, delivered the results to the Ministry of Higher Education.77

Repeatedly, Petraeus found himself confronting the Gordian knot that was de-Baathification. He and his fellow division commanders in the Sunni Arab areas faced a dilemma: how to reengage capable members of the former elite--who had belonged to the Baath party but were not convinced Saddamists--if they were barred from public employment in a society where most jobs were in the public sector? What about the mining explosives expert, the best in Mosul, who had been a firca? What about the hundreds of elementary and high school teachers? What of the former Baathist Province Council members who had been supportive despite the personal risk? Time and again, Petraeus fashioned compromises that he hoped would not violate any regulations or policies. Late in 2003, for example, the division staged Baath Party renunciation ceremonies--attended by thousands--which tried symbolically to wipe the Slate clean for former party members and give them a chance to renounce the use of violence and pledge support for the new Iraq. "We tried everything we could to string this along," says Petraeus.

**Guiding from Behind**

Even as he took the initiative on numerous fronts, Petraeus was trying to encourage the new governor to exercise as much authority as possible. He saw his job as "coaching and mentoring" the emerging Iraqi leaders.78 In that vein, he invited experts from the faculty at West Point and elsewhere to give council members tutorials on the theory and mechanics of democracy--political philosophy, economics, and governance.

Sometimes the line blurred between who was in charge and who was the power behind the throne. Petraeus made it a habit, for example, to attend the twice-weekly meetings of the Province Council, where he always sat next to Governor Al Basso--thereby lending gravity (and resources) to the proceedings. In addition, he met with Al Basso almost daily. In the beginning, both men signed all provincial directives. As Petraeus told a reporter, there was no confusion about his position: "I am the occupying power, make no mistake."79 But an occupying power hoping to retreat. His goal was to "break the mindset of a docile, waiting-for-commands-from-the-top Iraq."

He advised the governor on various matters. The university chancellor in office when the 101st arrived, for example, was a former level three Baath Party member. Rather than embarrass I and antagonize the chancellor by firing him outright, Petraeus suggested that Al Basso give him emeritus status and a stipend (to have some leverage over him), and name a successor. Petraeus also wanted to give the Provincial Council more than symbolic status. Under the former Iraqi structure, political bodies had
few resources. Most monies flowed from ministries directly to their provincial directors general, bypassing provincial governors and councils. To steer ministry funds toward projects the governor and council wanted, Petraeus required the ministry directors general--if they wanted support from the 101st -- to sit in on Province Council meetings and listen to competing arguments. The result was full attendance, and the council did eventually get some input into how the ministries’ money was spent.

At the same time, Petraeus realized he faced unrealistic expectations on the part of many Iraqis--what he and his staff called the "man on the moon problem." Iraqis would argue that the US had put a man on the moon and toppled Saddam in three weeks, so why couldn't Americans provide clean drinking water or 24-hour electricity immediately? There was no baseline for what constituted normal, pre-war service, adds Colonel Anderson: "If you don't have a baseline, it's hard to measure your progress." Petraeus also learned that "you could never generalize in Iraq." Flexibility, he adds, counted for a great deal:

“One of the tests for a commander--at all levels--is to recognize the environment and to adjust and adapt constantly to it. What worked in Mosul might not have worked in Tikrit. In fact, what worked in Mosul today might not even work in Mosul tomorrow.”

Nonetheless, 45 days after its arrival in northern Iraq, the 101st had made substantial progress. It had restored power and water to over 90 percent of Mosul. Telephones worked and even had international access. Solders were helping with the grain harvest. There were plans to rehabilitate a massive irrigation system in western Ninevah. Efforts were even underway to reestablish a summer soccer program, with 160 sponsored teams playing on replanted soccer fields. "Our feeling was," says Petraeus, "that if they were tired enough at night, they wouldn't shoot at us." Swimming pools reopened, as did parks, restaurants, an amusement park and other facilities.

The army was also active on the security front--by mid-May they had uncovered some 400 weapons caches. The 101st was conducting roughly 200 patrols a day throughout the province. The division had started to rebuild the police, the judicial system and the prisons. "We're as intent on winning the peace as we were on winning the war," Petraeus told a reporter. On May 17, the governor opened an additional 31 private gas stations to complement the nine government-owned ones.

That didn't mean problems had vanished. There was still trash piled everywhere, regular gunfire at night, rising taxi fares, long gas lines and rationing of some goods. But achievements were sufficient that by the end of May, US Army commanders concluded that the 101st could take on more. Its area of operations was therefore expanded to include the largely Kurdish provinces of Dahuk, Irbil, and Suleimaniya. This thrust Petraeus directly into the thick of US-Kurd relations and necessitated more frequent meetings with Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani.

First Violence

But while Petraeus' area of responsibility expanded, his authority was not unlimited. As the general was finding, on some matters he could take executive decisions; in others, his hands were tied. One such case was the issue of pay for the tens of thousands of former Iraqi military. Shortly after the Mosul election, Petraeus had started weekly Wednesday Social Club meetings with the retired officers' association. At these meetings, officers drank chai and complained bitterly at having no income. They were particularly angry that the US had failed to reward--even to the extent of a small stipend--what they characterized as deliberately minimal Iraqi Fifth Corps resistance during the war. They were also providing the Americans who met with them a steady stream of raw intelligence--for which they likewise expected compensation.
Petraeus assured them repeatedly that there would be a solution to their pay dilemma. What he did not realize was how long it would take. A promise he’d made in early May, based on assurances from ORHA, that salaries would be restored was still unfulfilled by early June. On June 5, Petraeus predicted in the nightly conference call with his boss that there would soon be violence over non-payment of military salaries.

This issue was not unique to northern Iraq. The resentment and hostility of the former army was palpable—although in Mosul there had been so far no concerted action. Sporadic shootings throughout the province proved isolated incidents and did not involve Americans. For 10 days in early June, however, military groups protested at City Hall—as they did throughout Iraq—over the lack of the promised payments. On June 12, during a major demonstration, violence finally erupted in Mosul. Iraqi police, feeling outnumbered, shot four protesters—killing one and wounding three. A riot ensued as an infuriated mob attacked several police stations in the city’s center and the police fled. Two US vehicles were burned and 18 American soldiers wounded (although all returned to duty within days). The center of Mosul became a ghost town. Shops shut down and the 101st cordon off the area.

Petraeus knew he had to react forcefully. He spoke first, and sternly, to Governor Al Basso. Petraeus and the governor declared a moratorium on demonstrations: any gathering of 15 or more required permission from the governor and Petraeus to meet. Brigade Commander Colonel Anderson taped a message for television announcing the new rules. The 101st also arrested 12 police officers involved in the shooting which sparked the riot. Soldiers moved in force into the Governorate Building and the city center.

However, Petraeus and Anderson decided against imposing a curfew at sundown. "Petraeus would ask me every night, should we put a curfew in, and I said no," recalls Anderson. The days of summer were very hot; most Mosul residents did their shopping at night. Were a curfew in place, it was not clear how ordinary people would manage their daily routine.

As for the military pay issue, the riot in Mosul—and more violent ones the same day in other Iraqi cities—seemed to attract the official attention that demonstrations had not. In Baghdad, one US soldier and many Iraqis were killed, as were soldiers and civilians in the southern city of Basra. Two days later, Petraeus and other division commanders firmly voiced their concerns to CPA officials following the "change of command" ceremony in Baghdad for Generals Wallace and Sanchez. On June 23, 2003, Walter Slocombe, the CPA advisor on defense, announced that former soldiers henceforth would receive a monthly stipend of $50 to $150, depending on rank. Recipients had to renounce Baathism and violence. No internal security officers or top-ranked Baath Party officials were eligible. CPA also announced it would start recruiting for a New Iraqi Army, envisioned to reach about 60,000 troops.

Again, it fell to the military to make the payments happen. Within days, the 101st had set up an enormous military pay site located in a former restaurant on the east bank of the Tigris River. For three months, until the CPA created an actual pay system through Iraqi banks, the 101st handed out back pay. It was a complex process. Applicants had to register and have their status verified. 101st soldiers set up a system of lines for waiting applicants. They provided golf carts for old or disabled soldiers. They set up tents to shield those in line from the hot sun, placed dozens of porta-johns in the area, and provided drinking water. They also protected the claimants from potential attacks. Though the former Iraqi soldiers found the process time-consuming and at times demeaning, Petraeus ordered the 101st troopers to be courteous and treat the claimants with respect as fellow soldiers.

Security Profile. As he demonstrated in deciding against a curfew, Petraeus had decided on the whole to maintain as low-profile a security posture as possible. There were threats—but they were dealt
with quietly. By June, for example, there were rumors that Mosul was attracting foreigners bent on destabilizing the city. To find these individuals, the 101st in late summer formed a joint interagency task force for counterterrorism. This was a model Petraeus knew from Bosnia; he had even arranged to have one of his key intelligence analysts from Bosnia transferred to the 101st upon her return to the US. The task force included agents from DIA, CIA, FBI, NSA, special military units, and others. "That organization was crucial," says Petraeus, "because it pulled together all the intelligence--human, signals, any flavor--to create network-linked diagrams that showed the structure of the bad guys in our area and enabled targeted operations rather than large sweeps."

Based on task force-generated intelligence, the division began raiding hotels and houses. In a single night, they could hit upwards of several dozen targets--a daunting logistical operation. In one instance, they simultaneously raided 35 targets in Mosul alone--during which they captured 22 and killed one. Most of the individuals they sought were former hardened Baathists or criminals, as well as occasional foreigners. But the 101st--following Petraeus' dictum that no operation should create more enemies than it took off the streets--sought to refrain from the more intrusive "cordon and search" sweep procedures common in other areas of Iraq. Instead, they used a "cordon and knock" approach, which did not call for kicking in doors. Soldiers even visited neighborhoods the morning after a raid to explain what they had done and why. They also handed out leaflets asking for help, which gave a phone number for reporting on insurgents.

The 101st also paid compensation. After a raid which damaged property or civilians, division engineers, lawyers and others from the so-called Task Force Neighborhood returned to register claims from the families of any Iraqis who had been inadvertently killed ($1,000 each), and from property owners. When a former Iraqi ammunition supply point caught fire and stockpiled munitions exploded, the Army paid for damage to nearby neighborhoods. When the 101st killed Saddam's two sons and dismantled the house they were hiding in, neighbors were compensated for collateral damage. By September, the division had paid out over $200,000 in compensation.

**Financing a New Society**

Petraeus owed his ability to make such payments to confiscated Iraqi funds. When Ambassador Bremer visited Mosul in May, he asked Petraeus what he needed. "I said that what we need is money... Money is ammunition in this fight," Petraeus remembers. But at that time, military officers were unable by law to spend operational funds on local needs and had, in any event, limited operational cash. Yet the military faced urgent needs among the local population, and Iraq's was a cash economy. Commanders also could not sign commercial contracts. During the war, as Petraeus reminded Bremer, "officers could launch a half-million dollar missile with a single radio call with no questions asked." By contrast, remembers the general, "getting a few thousand dollars after the major fighting was over required, in the beginning, navigation of an unbelievable bureaucracy."

Bremer, who heard similar complaints from other commanders, created the Commander's Emergency Response Program, or CERP. US soldiers had discovered upwards of $770 million in Baathist caches in Baghdad alone; these and other seized monies were the source for initial CERP funds. Under CERP, commanders could use the funds for reconstruction projects--"the building, repair, reconstitution, and reestablishment of the social and material infrastructure in Iraq." The monies were considered to belong to the Iraqi people. Spending them was far less cumbersome than spending congressionally--appropriated funds, although units were required--to ensure fairness and accountability--to report weekly to higher headquarters on the dates, locations and amounts spent on CERP projects. Initially, divisions were able to draw $25,000 to $100,000. The amounts increased later as the program took hold (with accounts replenished after expenditures were properly documented).
Petraeus and the 101st made good use of the CERP funds. As he notes: "You could do an enormous amount with that money, particularly at that time." In late June, for example, Director Kifah Mohammad Kato of Sinjar Hospital in a remote area near the Syrian border lamented to a soldier from the 101st that the pediatric wing in his hospital had been destroyed. The soldier relayed the request to Lieutenant Colonel Hank Arnold, a battalion commander in charge of 89 villages, 350,000 people and 6,800 square miles. Since early June, Arnold had disbursed some $2030,000 a week in CERP monies for local reconstruction projects.

Arnold hosted meetings three times a week to hear requests. There were parameters. For projects over $10,000, Arnold solicited three bids and needed permission from a superior: from his brigade commander for jobs $10-50,000; from General Petraeus for those $50,000 and up. If the project was small, less than $10,000, a single bid would suffice. At the Sinjar Hospital, a week after Director Kato made his appeal, a Humvee pulled up carrying the first installment of what would eventually be $9,600 in cash. Because it was less than $10,000, the monies could be spent with minimal paperwork. An oversight team of five doctors divided the work into 15 parts, which went to 15 local contractors. Within four weeks, the pediatric wing was rebuilt and refurnished.

The division adapted US federal procurement and fiscal procedures to account for Iraqi monies spent. One officer reviewed bids and contracts, another accounted for the cash disbursed, and a lawyer audited the accounts. The division also tracked all the projects it sponsored: every day at 5:30 p.m. a chart posted at division headquarters showed who had spent how much that day and on what. "It almost became a race and a contest to see who could outspend the other on these projects that would be seen, were humanitarian in nature and would show that we're here as helpers, rather than occupiers," says Judge Advocate Hatch. Petraeus' own spending agent, Captain Julie Simoni, acquired the nickname "Captain Money penny" because the general checked with her daily about how much she had spent, and employed her to fund the projects he initiated during his own tours of the region.

By mid-October, the 101st had provided $28 million for 3,600 CERP projects. It refurbished more than 400 schools, bought school supplies, repaired police stations and detention facilities, put yellow reflectors on roadways, painted over graffiti, purchased equipment for security forces, created a small business loan program, improved orphanages, rebuilt border forts, funded an employment program, and even planted some 25,000 trees. Iraqis did most of the labor and engineering, which helped to revive the economy. The challenge, at the brigade level, was to prioritize which projects were funded. Should money go to local projects, or to division-wide ones? Recalls Anderson:

"It became like city government anywhere. Do you rebuild the airport because that serves everybody, or do you rebuild that hospital in that zone?"

At first, the 101st proved the big spender within the US military of CERP monies, though other commanders began to make increasing use of them throughout the summer. Nationwide, $78.6 million in CERP money funded some 11,000 projects from June to mid-October. In Baghdad, for example, CERP monies paid Iraqis to clean streets and buildings, bought generators and air conditioners, and refurnished jails and police stations. In other parts of Iraq, it paid for water and sewage system repairs, bridge and road reconstruction, humanitarian relief, plus the expenses of establishing governing councils and a judicial infrastructure. Almost all the CERP monies went to Iraqi contractors. By contrast, the $3 billion the US Congress allocated in April 2003 for CPA reconstruction activities went mostly to US contractors awarded nationwide reconstruction contracts; progress on those projects had been excruciatingly slow.
to Mosul to allow other divisions to catch up. Meanwhile, on September 17, 2003, the Bush Administration asked Congress for a supplementary appropriation of $87 billion to fund the Iraq mission; of that, $18.6 billion would go to post-war reconstruction in Iraq. As the value of CERP became more widely publicized, a CERP allocation of $180 million was belatedly added to the bill.

On October 10, Petraeus in a briefing to a visiting congressional delegation added his voice to those urging Congress to approve the bill. Petraeus believed fervently in the power of the small sums. As he had told Bremer and frequently repeated: "Money is ammunition." Quite apart from the benefits the small projects brought Iraqis, strategic use of the CERP money had helped US soldiers gather intelligence, prevent ambushes and find weapons. Discretionary funds like the CERP money, he argued, had been indispensable because they allowed US commanders to pay for urgent small-scale projects with minimal paperwork required.

There were concerns about CERP, chief among them that an unprincipled commander could easily abuse the system. Congress had also allocated billions specifically for the kind of infrastructure and training projects CERP funded; it did not want to double-fund. But by November, the military prevailed and, on November 6, 2003, President Bush signed into law a bill which allowed the federal government to fund CERP projects in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A Hot July

That Petraeus' strategy of collaborative engagement was working to some degree became clear during an incident on July 2. At the time, Petraeus and Colonel Anderson were outside Mosul at an early July Fourth celebration. They rushed back when reports arrived of a shootout between US forces and Kurds. A boat carrying a US military patrol had ventured into the wrong place on the Tigris River at the wrong time. For several weeks, Baathist resisters had been taking occasional potshots at a Kurdish compound from the river. When the US boat, appeared that night, the Kurds thought it was another Baath group and fired at the boat. The US soldiers, unaware of the confusion, returned fire and called for help from ground and air quick reaction forces. The initial fire from the boat killed two Kurdish soldiers and a Kurdish television reporter.

This was a new kind of incident for the 101st. For some weeks, there had been ongoing skirmishes--with shootings and occasional deaths--between the Kurdish peshmerga fighters and Arabs. Colonel Anderson and others had had to close down some Kurdish compounds and limit their autonomy. But now US forces were involved. Petraeus and Anderson were at pains to prevent the incident from escalating into a full-blown battle. Instead, they used their relationships with the civilian authorities to calm the situation. Petraeus called Kurdish leader Barzani and explained the situation. They also quickly summoned the Kurdish deputy mayor of Mosul, Khessro Goran, with whom they had good relations. Goran did much to placate the Kurds in the compound. The following week, Anderson flew to Kurdistan, apologized publicly on television for the incident, and paid the families of those who had died $1,000 each.

The 101st also scored military achievements. Many of them owed their success to local intelligence assistance, which allowed operations to proceed accurately and without reprisal. In the division's most publicized operation, an informant walked into a division civil-military ops center at Mosul airfield, and reported that Saddam's sons Uday and Qusay were hiding at his house. The two were Numbers 2 and 3 on the US most-wanted list. On July 22, soldiers of the 101st together with Special Operations Forces surrounded the house. After Uday and Qusay refused to surrender and three soldiers were wounded trying to enter the house, the 101st fired some 16 TOW missiles and the two were killed, along with a security guard and a son of one of the brothers. Investigators found $1.3 million in dinar and dollars inside.
But even that victory had a price. The insurgency had been gathering strength in other parts of Iraq. After Uday and Qusay died, an insurgent cell operating in the Tigris River valley apparently took revenge. On July 24, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) hit a 101st Division convoy on a remote desert road some 50 miles south of Mosul. Three soldiers were killed. Colonel Hodges, as brigade commander in the area, gathered the sheikhs and other Iraqi leaders in the area to deliver the message that such hostilities were unacceptable. But they had not been a surprise. "We knew that people were trying to infiltrate, to establish bases of operation. We knew there were huge amounts of money out there funding this effort," says Petraeus. Two nights after Uday and Qusay's deaths, US forces in Mosul captured a former colonel from Saddam's intelligence service with $350,000 on him.

Petraeus was well aware that he was not operating in a vacuum. The security situation in Iraq was uneven; many areas—especially in and around Baghdad, and just south of the 101st area in what was known as the "Sunni triangle"—were very dangerous. General John Abizaid (who had replaced General Franks as chief of US Central Command) said on July 16 that American forces faced "a classical guerrilla-type campaign." On August 19, coalition efforts were dealt a major blow when the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Sergio de Mello, serving temporarily as UN special representative to Iraq, was assassinated at UN headquarters in Baghdad. Within days, the UN had withdrawn its staff and operations from Iraq citing insufficient security. A number of non-governmental organizations quickly followed suit. "When they left," recalls Anderson, "we suffered." Ten days later, a car bomb outside a mosque in Najaf killed a prominent Iraqi Shiite spiritual leader, along with nearly 100 bystanders. On September 20, Iraqi Governing Council member Aqila al-Hashemi was shot leaving her house; she soon died.

Training. But even as the 101st carried out raids, it was also—in accordance with CPA policy—trying gradually to shift security responsibility to Iraqi forces. Petraeus reasoned that sooner or later Iraq would need Iraqi forces, and in the short-term newly trained recruits could help the 101st with a variety of routine security tasks. Beyond that, providing security could employ some of the tens of thousands of idled former soldiers throughout the province.

Again, the division proved ahead of the curve. An Air Defense unit, helped by a few former infantry drill sergeants from other 101st units, began in mid-May to train former soldiers as an Iraqi infantry company; the first class graduated in July. This so-called Joint Iraqi Security Company (JISC) included one platoon of Kurdish peshmerga forces; and two platoons of combined former Free Iraqi Forces (former exiles, many of them loyal to Ahmed Chalabi, trained by the US and others, who reentered Iraq with the Americans) and former Iraqi army soldiers. The new company was intended to demonstrate how a new integrated Iraqi force might work.

CPA was not sure it liked the JISC model. When Ambassador Bremer and CPA Defense Adviser Slocombe visited Mosul in mid-May, CPA had not yet created standards for the Iraqi army; discussions were still ongoing as to whether there should even be an Iraqi army. Moreover, CPA had ordered Free Iraqi Forces dismantled, not incorporated into a new militia. These differences were ironed out, however, and the 101st continued an aggressive public safety training program.

Colonel Anderson and the other brigade commanders also began training Facility Protection Forces—individuals who could guard banks, government offices, and ministry facilities. It was hoped they could prevent any further looting, as well as insurgent activity. In other examples, two Long Range Surveillance detachments assigned to the 101st trained border guards. A correctional custody training detachment from the US Army Reserve (which Petraeus had not even known existed in the Army until one was attached to the 101st) helped train prison guards. A Military Police unit, also from the Reserves, helped establish a provincial police academy. During the summer, it opened a temporary academy in Mosul and then, on
September 27, the division opened a permanent Public Safety Academy for training provincial police, fire, and emergency response personnel. Academies were also opened at several locations in western Nineveh, in Irbil, and in Suleimaniya to train border guard battalions.

By late October 2003, Petraeus had under his command some 11,000 Iraqi police officers, border guards, civil defense troops and facility protection guards. Petraus—though he kept some of his troops at key city installations—was confident enough about his Iraqi forces to start slowly reducing the number of US soldiers in Mosul proper, gradually consolidating them at larger bases, most on the outskirts of the city. This was part of a larger military plan to reduce the US presence in Iraq from 130,000 to 100,000 troops by the middle of 2004.

Early Autumn Stillness

By September, a kind of calm reigned in Mosul. Petraeus even deliberately went off the airwaves for a while to demonstrate that the governor and other political leaders were now in charge. The habits of democratic government were slowly strengthening. There had been a brief hiatus after the original May 5 Mosul election because Ambassador Bremer in late May called a halt to local elections throughout Iraq. His reason: Marines in the Shi'a city of Najaf had scheduled elections for a provincial government but, as the early June vote approached, it seemed likely that candidates unacceptable to the US would win, so Bremer cancelled it. He then imposed a temporary ban on all balloting.

In Nineveh, however, 101st commanders had several elections in the works. So Petraeus applied for a waiver to the ban and, in June, Bremer granted him an exception. Since then, the division had organized elections in the majority of districts and cities within the sector. Colonel Anderson and his 2nd Brigade, for example, organized nine elections in the area around Mosul. Districts and cities under control of the 3rd Brigade in western Nineveh voted respectively on July 19, 22 and 28, and August 4 and 11. Soon, most cities had a mayor and a police chief. Other projects had also advanced. The division facilitated the first major private investment deal outside Baghdad--a $17 million dollar project to refurbish a hotel on the Tigris River in Mosul. Troops of the 101st had helped to uncap local oil wells, stabilized a dam, irrigated wheat fields, and started internet cafes. The 101st noted Petraeus, had been "a bit ahead of the power curve." Small security victories also accumulated. In mid-September, Saddam's defense minister Sultan Hasham Ahmed surrendered after Petraeus--realizing from intelligence reports that the general was more a career military officer than a Saddam loyalist--appealed to his sense of honor and guaranteed the safety of his family. "We eventually were able to use a combination of harassment, talking, and negotiating to get him to surrender with no conditions whatsoever, other than that I was nice to his family and treated them with dignity and respect," recalls Petraeus.

That was not to say that what the 101st had created was anything like model democracy. The Nineveh Province Council, for example, was still more of a debating society than a functioning legislative body. It was often indecisive and divided. There were multiple committees, but few proved effective. As Colonel Anderson put it in September: the Council "hasn't voted on squat yet." To a degree, Petraeus sympathized. "The Iraqis did not understand democracy or market economics ... because they hadn't been allowed to even discuss such subjects in universities and schools," he comments. "They certainly didn't know what shape and size and form democracy should take for Iraq, either at the national, regional or local levels. That's what they were working out.

In October 2003, the 101st got a lesson in overreaching when an attempt to promote women's political interests backfired. The Province Council was almost exclusively male. The CPA representative in Mosul, Herro Mustafa, decided to arrange a meeting for women to allow them to select from among their number
a few to represent women's issues. She secured General Petraeus' and Colonel Anderson's agreement to help. The event, however, proved too much too soon. First of all, political parties packed it with their representatives. Second, women did not attend as free agents. Instead, men took the nominations for the women. It was a fiasco.

Nor was security fully under control. Some 3-5 small hostile incidents occurred daily; Army forces arrested an average of 11 people a day. Youths hurled rocks at joint patrols in several areas of Mosul. As for conditions of daily life, Iraqi complaints were steady: the price paid to farmers for wheat was too low, the price of flour in the market was too high, roads needed repair, and weapons were ubiquitous.

The 101st however, was a presence in Nineveh in a way that the CPA still was not. Bremer still had no permanent representative in over half of Iraq's 18 provinces. A Mosul Province Council member told an American reporter that he had never dealt with CPA, only with the 101st. Secretary Rumsfeld and Ambassador Bremer in June had commissioned a report on reconstruction efforts from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)--and not much had changed by September. The CSIS team, which commended the "exceptional work of the coalition military forces in carrying out tasks far removed from their combat duties," found CPA in poor shape. It wrote:

The CPA lacks the personnel, money, and flexibility needed to be fully effective. Military officers and civilians are carrying out post-conflict reconstruction efforts in a war zone. Every small step of progress is counterbalanced by fundamental problems that must be addressed before the CPA can capitalize on the advances seen in particular towns or provinces throughout Iraq.

The team recommended that CPA immediately improve public safety, increase Iraqi ownership of the rebuilding process, offer mass employment opportunities, decentralize its own functions, improve the communication and marketing of coalition goals, and provide more flexible funds for reconstruction. "The US government," it concluded, "both the executive branch and the Congress--must change certain business-as-usual practices in order to maximize the CPA's opportunities to be successful."

Petraeus and his commanders knew the situation continued to be precarious. For one thing, the CERP funds had started to run out just as the division became aware that insurgents were making another concerted effort to disrupt Mosul and Nineveh. In addition, the Moslem holy month of Ramadan was coming. It would start on October 31 and run until Thanksgiving. Ramadan was traditionally a time of religious fervor and heightened passions as Moslems fasted through the daylight hours and attended sacred services. The presence of US troops in Iraq, combined with the simmering activities of insurgents and Saddam loyalists, almost guaranteed a difficult Ramadan season.

Ramadan

Signs of increasing unrest came quickly. Militants until now had been unable to put down roots in Mosul. Most of the violence had erupted in Baghdad, in the Sunni triangle in central Iraq, and as far south as Basra. But now insurgents targeted both Iraqis and Americans in the Nineveh capital. On October 28, independent journalist Ahmed Shawkat was shot in his Mosul office. On November 4, gunmen assassinated Ismail Youssef, a Nineveh judge investigating human rights abuses. In early November, a US patrol stationed at Mosul University to watch for IEDs and other suspicious items was ambushed during a shift changeover. The staff sergeant was killed and others wounded. That same week, some six soldiers died in other incidents.

Petraeus had feared as much. "The insurgents had reorganized. They knew that Mosul was critical, the leading city of the north historically, and that it was being held out by the coalition as a success," he says. "They couldn't let Mosul be the beacon of hope to the rest of the country, so they had to cause
problems there—and they had been trying for some months." US Central Command Chief General Abizaid agreed. "I think that the enemy's desire to spread chaos in Nasiriyah, Basra and up into Mosul and beyond is part of a strategy to make people believe that nowhere is safe in Iraq," he said. 107 Petraeus also believed that the fall-off in CERP money played a role. Finally, CPA funding shortfalls had resulted in nationwide gas and diesel shortages. In Mosul, lines not seen since May had become commonplace once again.

On November 7, Colonel Anderson felt he had no choice but to step up his own forcefulness. He recommended to General Petraeus that the 101st become more aggressive. It would act on information promptly, rather than waiting to confirm it beyond a doubt. Targeted raids for suspected insurgents, which had been conducted roughly every two weeks, would now be conducted more frequently. In some cases, instead of cordon-and-search operations, soldiers on a mission would move to the more belligerent cordon-and-search—for example, shooting the handle off a door instead of waiting for a resident to open it. Petraeus agreed, and Anderson briefed his commanders the next day on the new orders.

But November got worse. Four 101st helicopter crew members were killed when their aircraft was shot down just short of landing at the 4th Infantry Division's headquarters in Tikrit, south of Nineveh province. On November 15, two Black Hawk helicopters collided over Mosul. One, carrying a quick reaction force, had been circling an incident at a bank; the other, enroute to Mosul airfield, apparently descended to help and ran into the blacked-out circling aircraft. Seventeen members of the 101st died, the worst single-day loss since the division entered Iraq. On November 23, Iraqis killed two GIs in their vehicle, then a mob robbed the corpses. 108 By mid December, the 101st had lost 31 soldiers in six weeks—the most recent on December 5 when a single mortar round landed inside division headquarters and killed a soldier walking to the mess hall.

Meanwhile, the division's intelligence apparatus had been working overtime. In one early morning raid in early December, troops hit 43 separate locations simultaneously, and caught over 25 of their targets. Detention centers were full to bursting. Some locals complained that soldiers humiliated them. 109 US intelligence identified various Islamic extremist groups behind the violence, but at least one Moslawi noted that "it is those who lost jobs who are conducting operations against the Americans." Added Mishaa al Jabouri, the Mosul powerbroker who had stood on the steps of City Hall the previous April: "The honeymoon is over. We are becoming like everyplace else." 110

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Notes:
1. A number of additional logistical, air defense, artillery, armor, engineer, and signal battalions were attached to the division for the operations in Iraq.
3. Author's interview with General David Petraeus at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, on June 22, 2005. All further quotes from Petraeus, unless otherwise attributed, are from this interview and follow-up emails.
4. At the time the Division received orders to air assault north to Mosul, its forces were dispersed. The 1st Brigade was still deployed in An Najaf and Al Hilla, attached to the 82nd Airborne Division; 2nd and 3rd Brigades were in southern Baghdad; one infantry battalion was in western Baghdad attached to the 3rd Infantry Division while another was at Haditha Dam in western Iraq attached to a Special "Operations unit; and the Division's aviation and logistical forces were south of Baghdad at Iskandiriya Airfield.
5. **Author's interview with Colonel Joseph Anderson as part of a larger group conversation, in Cambridge, MA, on May 20 and 21, 2005. All further quotes from Colonel Anderson, unless otherwise attributed, are from these discussions.**

6. The 101st was assigned initially to Nineveh Province. It would take control (from Special Forces) of three Kurdish provinces--Irbil, Suleymaniya and Dahuk--as soon as possible. See Appendix I for map of the 101st Airborne's sector. The distance north-south was comparable to Washington to Philadelphia, while east-west was like New York City to Boston.

7. Petraeus also dispatched Brigadier General Benjamin Freakley, Assistant Division Commander for Operations (ADC-O) with an advance group to join Anderson at Mosul Airfield to establish satellite radio communications and a forward division command post.

8. Special Forces included such groups as the Green Berets' Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) teams, the Army counterterrorism I St Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta (or Delta Force), as well as Task Force 20 which was hunting Iraqi leaders and illegal weapons. Source: Atkinson, p. 204.

9. Colonel Michael Meese, "Leadership in a Time of Crisis: 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in Mosul, Iraq, PowerPoint presentation. Additional 101st forces, including an armored battalion attached from the 4th Infantry Division, arrived and settled in on Wednesday.

10. The 1974 Howitzer, the Annual of the USMA Class of 1974, p.484.


12. The Bush Administration created ORHA on January 20, 2003, to manage post-war operations in Iraq. Though located within the Department of Defense, it brought together officials from agencies and departments across the government.

13. **CALL Newsletter, "Targeting for Victory: winning the civil military operations," No. 03-23, September 2003.**


16. For more on the genesis of the plan, see Bremer, pp. 114-120.


18. **Author's telephone interview with Major (then-Brigadier) General Benjamin Freakley, December 20, 2005. All further quotes from General Freakley, unless otherwise attributed, are from this interview.**

19. Atkinson, In the Company Of Soldiers, p. 289. The US Army, by comparison, had a similar number of troops, but only 307 generals and 3,500 colonels.


22. The 101st eventually oversaw the election separately of a mayor and City Council. But at first the position was dual.

23. Mahmoud eventually refused to vote, claiming too many Saddam loyalists were among the delegates--and perhaps lacking the personal support for which he had hoped. But he pledged not to oppose the new government, and Petraeus later drafted him to run a Veterans Employment Center in Mosul.


27. In the fall, the Council did add four women, as well as several men from districts unrepresented in the first go round. At first, gender equality took a temporary back seat in the face of multiple urgent problems. In late May, however, one of the five officers elected under 101st supervision to the Iraqi Bar Association in Mosul was female.

28. For more on the summer's elections, see p. 49. The six northern provinces were Dahuk, Irbil, and Suleymaniya (all Kurdish), Nineveh and Sala ad Din (majority Sunni Arab), and At Timm (mixed ethnic groups).

29. Colonel Anderson and his staff lawyer in mid-May staged a welcome-to-Mosul visit for ORHA/CP A, large NGOs such as CARE or Doctors without Borders, and UN staff in an effort to persuade them to move their operations to Mosul. They did succeed in getting some organizations to open offices in Mosul--which the 101st
protected. CPA opened a Mosul office in late June. Note: Nabb had made friends with KDP leader Barzani during his 1991 service in northern Iraq.

30. As brigade commander, Anderson also had responsibility for another 25 towns and villages surrounding Mosul.

31. In June, CMOC relocated to the former Nineveh Hotel after the 101st refurbished it. At that point, responsibility for the CMOC transferred from the 2nd Brigade to the division. CPA and a number of contract organizations (Bechtel, Research Triangle Institute and others) then located there as well.


33. Iraqis had long favored propane rather than electric stoves because even under Saddam, electricity worked only an unpredictable 3-4 hours a day.

34. Petraeus obtained the services of US Army Attaché in Ankara Colonel Martin Rollinson, a fluent Turkish speaker (and friend of Petraeus). Rollinson, on loan to the division for over six months, set up a small command post on the Turkish side of the border to liaise with Turkish customs and border organizations and speed the flow of trucks.

35. The Humvee's full name is High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV).

36. Author's telephone interview with Richard Hatch, December 15, 2005. All further quotes from Hatch, unless otherwise attributed, are from this interview.


38. Author's interview with Lieutenant Colonel William Hickman as part of a larger group conversation, in Cambridge, MA, on May 20 and 21, 2005. All further quotes from Colonel Hickman, unless otherwise attributed, are from these discussions.

39. For a copy of the code of conduct, see Appendix 2.

40. Other US commanders in Iraq would eventually adopt a similar policy.

41. Throughout the 101st sector, peshmerga numbered some 77,000, of which 20,000 were professionally trained forces. The KDP controlled 65,000; the PUK 12,000. Source: Meese PowerPoint slide, "Former soldiers within region," p. 49.

42. After June, the commanders' update was moved back to 8:00 a.m.

43. A planning group daily took the results of the commanders' update meeting, wrote up concrete division goals from dealing with former Baathists to getting out the wheat harvest--and published daily orders.

44. Petraeus often recalled the words of British political scientist Martin Wight on competing schools of thought about international politics. "The truth is not to be found in anyone school of thought," wrote Wight, "but in the debate among them." Believing that applied to the 101st in Iraq, Petraeus sought to keep an open mind and welcome debate of various courses of action.

45. Petraeus' routine was reflected among his subordinates. Colonel Anderson, for example, started his day with a staff huddle at 6:00 a.m., followed by the 7:00 a.m. commanders' update with Petraeus. In the evening, Anderson's staff briefed him at 8:00 p.m., while at 9:00 he held a conference call with his own commanders. Topics included intelligence reports, a detainee count, how many cops were at work, how much money was available to spend, and so forth.

46. Thanks to large satellite dishes, the military had both secure and non-secure email.

47. Petraeus adds that planners do, to a degree, generate ideas. But most staff members, especially those involved in night operations, are working too hard to have the time for that.


49. CALL Newsletter, p. 19.

50. For a chart of officers, units and their assignments, see Appendix 3.

51. For more on training, see p. 45. In addition, an Army Reserve engineer group headquarters attached to the 101st was trained to do project assessment, design, contracting and quality control. They lacked only money, which Petraeus was happy to supply.

52. For more details on this incident, see pp. 44-45. Petraeus also conducted a tactical after-action review to preclude similar situations from arising in the future.

53. The money was in bags under water in the bank basement.

54. Bremer, p. 68. The first payroll--which was for March, with April, May and June to be paid the following month--came to $45 million and was drawn from a $1.7 billion pool of frozen Iraqi assets sitting in US banks since the end of the first Gulf War in 1991. Sources: Scott Wilson, "US delays timeline for Iraqi government," New York Times, May 22, 2003, p. A 1; also Rory McCarthy, "Iraq: after the war: Saddam's army and apparatus sacked," Guardian, May 24, 2003, p.17.
55. Mishaan Al Jabouri, for example, the powerful Mosul leader, had strong ties to Syria and now offered his services to restart trade.
56. For a copy of the May 6 orders, see Appendix 4. The UN Security Council voted to lift the sanctions on May 22, 2003.
57. With Petraeus' encouragement, the governor then arranged with Syrian officials for visa-free travel between Nineveh and Syria (passports and IDs were still required).
58. Ironically, there had been enough electricity in the early days thanks to the Mosul dam and numerous cut electrical lines to Baghdad. Once those lines were restored, the electricity generated in Mosul went elsewhere and the city suffered outages.
59. The arrangement still stood as of September 2005. There was still no official price, but Iraqis meticulously recorded the amounts exchanged.
63. For further details on both decisions, see L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq (New York: Simon & Schuster) 2006, pp. 39-58.
64. On the same day, Bremer told Iraqi exile leaders that plans for a national assembly and interim government, which Gamer had indicated would be in place by the end of May, were being postponed indefinitely. Instead, CPA on July 13, 2003, appointed an interim Iraqi Governing Council.
65. The Baath Party, thought to number about 2 million under Saddam, had classified its members into eight categories.
70. The order also dissolved the defense and information ministries, as well as the security services and their courts. This reflected new thinking in Washington, which before the war had endorsed Garner's intention to keep the army intact, pay soldiers wages, and use them on public works projects. Garner also planned for the US military to be out of Iraq by the end of August 2003. See: George Packer, The Assassins' Gate; America in Iraq, (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux), 2005, p. 133.
72. Bremer, p. 56.
73. Packer, p. 240.
75. There were in fact two forms available, one a disavowal agreement for those who had once been Baathists, and the other a denunciation agreement for those who claimed never to have been party members.
77. The Iraqi Governing Council, which took charge of the national De-Baathification Committee in early November 2003), never acted on the reconciliation commission results and prevented any further such initiatives. Eventually, many university faculty level firca or above were fired, and the de-Baathification policy created tens of thousands of unemployed and disaffected Iraqis throughout the country, with particularly large concentrations in the so-called "Sunni Triangle."
80. The signal battalion commander brokered a deal to place a satellite downlink truck next to the main telephone switch to provide long distance access that made money fur the Province, and was a first in Iraq.
82. The weekend of May 23, for example, 10 Kurds were killed in Nineveh Province in gun battles with Arabs enraged over land seizures.
84. For a list of extremists detained, see Appendix 5.
85. During the war, the 101st used 113 such missiles.
87. Martins, p.6
88. Martins, p.7. Congressional funds were anyway not available in any substantial amount until December 2003.
91. The US also controlled billions of dollars in frozen Iraqi assets, mostly in bank accounts; these were not allocated to CERP.
93. The fugitives' family members had been evacuated from the house.
94. Packer, p. 302. Abizaid’s characterization contradicted Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, who had distanced himself from the term "guerrilla war."
95. The model was eventually used nationwide
103. CPA was chronically short-staffed: in the summer of 2003 it had less than 50 percent of planned-for staff, and the number never rose above 70 percent. Source: George Packer, The Assassins' Gate; America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux), 2005, p. 184.
106. In October, insurgents hit the Red Cross and several police stations in Baghdad on the same morning; in November, a suicide bomber exploded a car at the Italian base in Nasiriya, killing 19 Italians. Source: Packer, p. 310.
109. Caryl and Barry, Newsweek.

Reading Time: 27621 words @ 230 wpm = 120 minute
The Accidental Statesman

Appendix

Appendix 2
Orders Relating to Law Enforcement in Mosul

To ensure the safety, security, and public order for the people of Mosul and Coalition Forces, the Commander of Coalition Forces for Northwest Iraq and the Mayor of Mosul City-Ninewah Province issue the following orders:

The Mosul Chief of Police is directed to order the resumption of all law enforcement activities, the reopening of all precinct stations, and the return to duty of all police officers, except those officers who were previously dismissed for corruption. All police officers shall return to duty with their issued uniforms, weapons, and ammunition.

All police officers are ordered to perform their duty to protect the citizens of Mosul and their property. Merely showing up for work will not constitute compliance. Police officers who merely show up at the police station and do not perform police functions will not be paid.

Working closely with officials of the Coalition Forces, the Chief of Police is responsible for creating and maintaining a safe and secure environment in Mosul where business establishments can operate, Government offices can function, and public utilities, schools, universities, infrastructure, and residential areas are protected. The Chief of Police shall also ensure that public records and historical properties are safeguarded.

As directed by the Military Police of the Coalition Forces, police officers will conduct joint patrols and other law enforcement activities with Coalition Forces. The military police will also provide training and assistance to Mosul police officers.

As a condition of employment and prior to being paid, all police officers must sign either the Agreement to Disavow Party Affiliation (if ever a member of the Ba'ath Party) or the Statement of Denunciation (if never a member of the Ba'ath Party). Any police officer refusing to sign the applicable document will not be employed as a police officer. Signing the applicable document does not, however, grant a police officer immunity for any crimes or acts committed under the former regime.

A police officer's sole compensation is his government-paid salary. No police officer will abuse his position of trust for personal gain. No police officer will unlawfully seize persons or property in order to extort any citizen (e.g., make an arrest or confiscate property and demand a fee for release). The Chief of Police shall immediately terminate the employment of any police officer who engages in any act of corruption, extortion, bribery, graft, or any other illegal act relating to the performance of his duties.

The Chief of Police shall maintain and provide daily to the Chief Judge and the designated military representative of the Coalition Forces a copy of the Daily Blotter that shall document all arrests and property seizures and account for the disposition or all persons and property seized during the previous 24-hour period.

Police officers shall enforce the Iraqi Penal Code with the exception of those sections relating to political offenses. Any questions of law regarding the interpretation or application of law must be directed to the Chief Judge or the Staff Judge Advocate, of the Commander of Coalition Forces for Northwest Iraq.

Police officers shall:
1. Provide any requested assistance to Coalition Forces without hesitation.
2. Surrender to Coalition Forces all military equipment including weapons, equipment, codes and other information, including but not limited to maps of minefields and locations of areas used for weapons research, testing, or storage, as well as any other dangerous or sensitive sites.

3. Report all suspected terrorists to Coalition Forces.

4. Report any information pertaining to programs for the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and other advanced military technologies.

5. Report any information pertaining to prisoners and missing persons from the conflicts with Iran and Kuwait.

6. Report any information pertaining to property and documents seized by Iraqi nationals during the conflicts with Iran and Kuwait, whether the seizures were made pursuant to military commands or orders, or for personal gain.

7. Report all information pertaining to anyone who may have committed crimes and atrocities against the people of Iraq, Iran, or Kuwait.

8. Safeguard public property and protect it from damage or destruction. This includes all public infrastructure, official records of any kind in any form (paper, electronic, magnetic tape, compact disc, or any other form of storage), schools, and universities. Report any suspected destruction or the threat of destruction to Coalition Forces immediately.

9. Treat all persons taken into custody humanely. Corporal and capital punishment is not permitted.

10. Ensure that all confined persons will remain incarcerated pending additional orders of the Coalition Forces Commander for Northwest Iraq or his designated representative.

Executed this ___ day of May, 2003.

DAVID H. PETRAEUS
Major General, US Army
Coalition Forces Commander for Northwest Iraq

GHANIM AL-BASO
Mayor
Mosul City and Ninewah Province
Appendix 3

### Decentralization to & Support of Capable/Leader

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Utilities &amp; Services</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Community Involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Propane and Benzene</td>
<td>ADC (0)</td>
<td>• Nineva/Mosul interim Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Harvest and Grain Board</td>
<td>ADC (0)</td>
<td>CG &amp; LNO to Mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Freedom Dam</td>
<td>ADC (S) &amp; ENG</td>
<td>LTC Lacquement &amp; COL Meese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Irrigation and Water</td>
<td>1 BCT, 3 BCT &amp; ENG</td>
<td>SJA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Electrical Power</td>
<td>ENG &amp; G-5</td>
<td>SJA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Telecommunications</td>
<td>501” SIG &amp; G-6</td>
<td>ADC (0) CA &amp; LTC Lacquement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Transportation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1 BCT &amp; ENG</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Railroad System</td>
<td>ADC (S) &amp; ENG</td>
<td><strong>Summer Youth Activities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public Transportation</td>
<td>ADC (S) &amp; 159 AVN</td>
<td><strong>Retired G.O Meetings</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Airfields</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>‘House of Hope’</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Captured Equipment Consolidation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Local Health Care Coordination</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CLV and Arms Cache Destruction</td>
<td>DIVARTY &amp; EOD</td>
<td><strong>Mosul University</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Captured Enemy Equipment DIVARTY</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Schools</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• UXO Clearance</td>
<td>DIVARTY &amp; EOD</td>
<td><strong>Local Newspapers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Issues</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Mosul TV and Radio</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mosul Police Training</td>
<td>2 BCT &amp; MPBN</td>
<td><strong>TFS Pothole, Graffiti, Neighborhood</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Border Guard Training</td>
<td>3 BCT, LRSC &amp; LRSD</td>
<td><strong>DM Surgeon &amp; MED BDE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NSF, JSC, and FPSF</td>
<td>DIVARTY &amp; BCTs</td>
<td><strong>159 AVN</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NR Recruiting and MEPS Station</td>
<td>DIVARTY &amp; 2 BCT</td>
<td><strong>BDE CDrs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NR Garrison and Training Facility</td>
<td>3 BCT</td>
<td>PSYOP &amp; BCTs</td>
</tr>
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<td>- Veterans Embayment Office DIVARTY</td>
<td>2 BCT</td>
<td>PAO &amp; IO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public Safety Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Soldier Morale</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Inter-Faith Religious Interaction</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hotdogs, Burgers, Ice &amp; Gatorade</td>
<td>DISCOM</td>
<td>DM/ CHAPLAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community Involvement</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Kurdish Coordination</strong></td>
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<td>• Border Operations (Syria)</td>
<td>3 BCT</td>
<td>CG &amp; 404” CA</td>
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<td>• Border Operations (Turkey)</td>
<td>311 MI (LRSC)</td>
<td>G-3 LNOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Border Operations (Iran)</td>
<td>311 MI (LRSC)</td>
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Appendix 4
Orders Relating To The Resumption Of Legal Trade In Northwestern Iraq

Whereas, the Commander of Coalition Forces for Northwest Iraq recognizes an emergency need for the resumption of "legal trade" in Northwestern Iraq with Syria and Turkey; and,

Whereas, the Commander of Coalition Forces, General Tommy R. Franks, has declared that "All barriers to free movement of people and goods, including illegal roadblocks and checkpoints, must come down;" and,

Whereas, "legal trade" is trade that complies with all existing embargos and other restrictions and limitations imposed by the Government of the United States and international bodies, including the United Nations, on the import and export of goods in Iraq.

Therefore, relying on my authority as the Commander of Coalition Forces for Northwest Iraq, I, Major General David H. Petraeus, issue the following emergency orders, said orders to remain in effect for the duration of the current crisis or until superseded by higher authority:

(1) The Chief of Customs for Northern Iraq shall direct all Customs Police officers to return to work and resume official duties.
(2) The Chief of Customs shall direct the re-opening of all Customs Offices within his jurisdiction.
(3) The Chief of Customs shall immediately terminate the employment of any Customs Police officer who engages in corruption, extortion, bribery, graft, or any other illegal act relating to the performance of his duties.
(4) Customs officials shall resume collecting lawful tariffs and taxes at the legal rates that were in effect prior to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom. These tariffs and taxes shall be accounted for and properly transferred to appropriate officials.
(5) Commerce and Customs officials in Northwestern Iraq shall contact and engage in discussions with officials in Syria and Turkey in order to normalize "legal trade."
(6) Soldiers from the Coalition Forces shall conduct joint operations with Customs Police, beginning initially at the office in Rabiya, in order to facilitate "legal trade," interdict illegal trade, capture former Regime officials attempting to flee Iraq, and perform other lawful border operations.
(7) All private groups and individuals shall cease and desist collecting illegal taxes, tariffs, and fees on "legal trade" coming into or passing through Iraq.

Furthermore, relying on my inherent authority as the Commander of Coalition Forces for Northwest Iraq, I, Major General David H. Petraeus, authorize the following emergency actions, said authorizations to remain in effect for the duration of the current crisis or until superseded by higher authority:

(1) Bona fide traders with Syria may travel to Syria in order to conduct their trade. Such traders may carry sufficient cash money to transact such trade.
(2) Individuals may import "legal trade" without the requirement of a certificate of origin (since this was a requirement of the prior Regime to restrict trade from countries deemed unfriendly to the former Regime) or import license.

Finally, nothing in this order permits the import or export of drugs or other illegal contraband, including stolen or looted property and weapons of mass destruction or materials that could be used to manufacture weapons of mass destruction, the import or export of goods and materials not constituting "legal trade," or the travel of individuals associated with the former regime who are being sought by Coalition Forces.
Executed: 6 May 2003

DAVID H. PETRAEUS
Major General, U.S. Army
Coalition Forces Commander for Northwest Iraq

NOTE:

On 8 May 2003, MG Petraeus made pen and ink changes to the original Order. These changes have been incorporated in this update. The changes were (1) the deletion of the word "Police" after the words "Chief of Customs" each time it appeared in the "Therefore" section and (2) addition of the words "or import license" at the end of the second paragraph of the "Furthermore" section.
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